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0.1 Introduction
This dissertation consists of four chapters which are all based on or deal with “Eco-
nomic Survey Analysis”. The economic analysis of survey data has a long tradition in
the field of economic analysis. There has been a strong improvement in the process of
data gathering and as a result, more and more high quality datasets are available for
scientific analysis. In Chapter 3 on the “Role of Data Production in Survey Analysis”
we discuss important issues regarding the interplay of the process of data production
and the process of data analysis in the case of survey data. Chapters 1, 2 and 4 are
all based on household survey data and bring forth arguments on principal points in
the economic literature which are mostly overlooked and deserve closer attention. Fur-
thermore, all three of these chapters provide the first analysis using Austrian data to
analyse the respective topic.
Chapter 1 examines the differences of same-gender versus cross-gender patterns in
the process of the intergenerational transmission of educational attainment in Austria.
This is the first analysis documenting the important role of gender patterns in the
intergenerational transmission of educational attainment. In Chapter 2 we investigate
the joint distribution of assets and liabilities of Austrian households. This is the first
analysis dealing explicitly with the relationship between assets and liabilities on the
basis of a micro-level dataset for Austria. While economic theory would suggest that
people with high amounts of debt tend to hold zero or few liquid assets empirical
analysis show the strong positive association between assets and liabilities. Finally
in chapter three we estimate average treatment effects on the treated to analyse the
effects of higher education on earnings and show how returns on education in Austria
are usually overestimated when ignoring selection bias based on parental education.
More detailed abstracts can be found in the appendix.
III
Chapter 1
The Gendered Aspects of the
Intergenerational Persistence of
Educational Attainment in Austria
This Chapter is based on joint work with Alyssa Schneebaum and published
in a slightly different version in Feminist Economics,
Fessler, P. and Schneebaum, A. (2012): Gender and Educational Attainment
Across Generations in Austria, Feminist Economics, 18:1, 161-188.1
1.1 Introduction
Gender-based differentials in educational attainment are an important part of the his-
tory of women’s oppression and an important aspect of the analysis of women’s rights
and opportunities. In this paper, we examine the stylized fact that descendants of par-
ents with higher levels of education are more likely to achieve higher levels of education
1A related paper - using the same dataset - which focuses more on delivering internationally compa-
rable results for Austria instead of the gender issue is also already published (Fessler, P., Mooslechner,
P., and Schürz, M. 2012)
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than descendants whose parents have less education, and we analyze the results by
the genders of the parents and children involved. Our gendered analysis is meant to
show that gender is an important variable in considering all aspects of one’s education,
playing a part in even the basic fact that there is intergenerational persistence in edu-
cational attainment.
In many instances, advantages and disadvantages are passed from one generation to the
next. A society that is characterized by a high degree of transmission of social status
may have problems in claiming meritocratic ideals; the same constraint is true regarding
gender-based equality if the educational transmission is characterized by differences for
men and women. Our main focus lies on examining the differences in the educational
transmission process between parents and children of the same gender compared to
parents and children of different genders.
We therefore test the following questions:
Q1. Is there an intergenerational persistence in educational outcomes, i.e. is the
education of parents and descendants positively correlated?
Q2. What is the relevance of gender in determining intergenerational persistence?
Are there any differences between same gender parent-children pairs and cross-gender
parent-children pairs?
Q3. Has the strength of the persistence varied over time, and if so, why?
We use a Markovian approach, along with univariate and multivariate economet-
ric techniques, to test these questions. The range of methods employed allows us to
check the robustness of our results. Due to the absence of long panel data series for
2
Austria, we use the Household Survey on Housing Wealth (HSHW), a cross sectional
survey which collects information on the respondents’ education along with data on the
educational level of their parents. We discuss the data in greater detail below.
The main question in this paper focuses on the gendered aspects of the intergenera-
tional transmission of education. As such, we pay careful attention to the trends in
educational attainment by gender. Before the 1970s, women had much lower rates of
education than their male peers. However, in the 1970s, the Austrian government in-
troduced several policies to increase educational attainment in general, but particularly
for children from low-income backgrounds. Given that females had significantly lower
educational attainment on average, they benefited more than males from this policy
change, as it increased educational access to previously constrained households and
families who presumably sacrificed their daughter’s educational opportunities more of-
ten than they did their son’s. Especially under the assumption that marginal returns to
education decrease with years of education, we would expect to see women experienc-
ing a stronger benefit from an expanse in public education funding, since females had
lower levels of education. Indeed, we can see that this policy helped females boost their
educational accomplishments. Moreover, there were other policy measures introduced
in the 1970s that promoted women’s rights in general, alongside the formation of the
feminist movement in Austria, which may have also had an impact on gender roles, ed-
ucational accomplishments, and educational transmission. We address the issue of the
educational reform and changes in women’s rights, and how those institutional changes
could influence the findings of our study, in more detail below.
In this study, we concentrate in the intergenerational correlation of education (Hertz
et al., 2007; Mulligan, 1999). While there is a strand of literature aimed at identifying
total causal effects of parents’ education on the educational attainment of their children
via twin datasets (Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2002), adoptee datasets (Plug, 2004), or
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school reforms (Black et al., 2005) to control for parents’ unobserved endowments, we
instead look at correlation, not causation. Some of the recent literature on the intergen-
erational transmission of various characteristics - such as education - focuses on causal
effects and we find that discussion important, so we highlight it below. However, the
causal approach is not the one we take in our empirical analysis. Generally speaking,
there are numerous factors that shape intergenerational mobility, described as follows.
Household income is a critical component of intergenerational transmission. Income
poverty is related to negative outcomes such as poor health and low levels of nutri-
tion and housing. Such conditions negatively affect the future life-chances of children.
Because it cumulates with other forms of disadvantages (such as a lack of access to
educational resources), low income mobility is especially harmful to the development
of children’s opportunities. The income of the household into which a child is born
will greatly affect the child’s access to resources and therefore class mobility, making
income class perpetual over generations. Children coming from high-income households
have more material resources to aid their social and intellectual development. Children
in these households may also positively benefit from a transmission of desirable verbal
skills and non-cognitive abilities such as motivation, socioemotional regulation, time
preference, personality factors and the ability to work with others (as summarized by
Heckman, 2008) while children in low-income households may receive lower levels of
those skills via intergenerational transmission. Children from high-income homes also
benefit from access to social networks that help their professional development. On
the other hand, there are particular skills that children in a working class family might
learn while their more economically well-off peers are excluded from that information.
However, the extra skills (say, for example, handicraft work) are likely to be useful
mainly, although of course not exclusively, for low-income jobs since it was workers in
those trades that taught it to the children, which furthers the intergenerational depen-
4
dence of income class transmission.
Household wealth is also an important component of intergenerational mobility. Wealth
constrained parents cannot invest as much in resources (including education) for their
children as can wealthy parents. Borrowing against future earnings is difficult, and
liquidity constraints affect investment in human capital (Becker and Tomes, 1979).
Wealthy parents can pass gifts and bequests on to their children, deepening the rela-
tionship between one’s own situation and his or her family background. Such wealth
transfers increase the asset holdings of only a portion of children and deteriorate the
principle of equal opportunity.
Educational attainment is significantly correlated across generations. Educational traits
persist between generations in all OECD countries, and the OECD claims that parental
education is by far the most important background characteristic in determining a
child’s level of education (see OECD 2008, p. 216). Belzil and Hansen (2003) argue
that household background variables - particularly parents’ education - account for 68%
of the explained cross sectional variations in schooling. The persistence of educational
attainment between parents and children plays a major role in limiting intergenerational
mobility in general, especially because one’s level of education so heavily influences one’s
life position.
Genetic factors might also matter when thinking about why certain outcomes persist
across generations. Children may inherit genetically based behavioral characteristics
from their parents. Herrnstein and Murray’s 1994 book The Bell Curve, for example,
argues that differences in outcomes are based primarily on genetic factors. However, the
contribution of genetic factors in studies of intergenerational mobility remains rather
unclear, and the study presented in The Bell Curve has been strongly disputed (Hansen
et al. (2004) provide one case for why that study was not relevant). Bowles et al. (2005)
find that little intergenerational inequality is due to parents passing IQ on to their chil-
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dren. Heckman (2008) shows that in the US, increased monetary investments during
early childhood and adolescence greatly increase high school graduation rates and col-
lege enrollment (p. 70), suggesting that social influences are far more important than
biological ones in determining a child’s educational success.
Many additional factors are interwoven in the process of intergenerational transmission
of inequality. Aside from wealth, income, parents’ educational attainment, and genet-
ics, a child’s social environment and his or her household structure is closely related
to this phenomenon. A thorough empirical assessment of every important character-
istic would require a survey containing data on a wide range of individual and social
characteristics of parents and children. Like most surveys, the HSHW does not in-
clude such extensive information. However, we do have data on parent’s education,
and as numerous studies have shown, this is a strong indicator for intergenerational
inequality because it is closely related to income and wealth. We therefore focus our
attention to the strength of educational persistence as an important measure of inter-
generational (im)mobility, by concentrating on the correlation between two generations.
1.2 Literature Overview
The theoretical background of most empirical models on intergenerational transmission
is the Becker-Tomes (1979, 1986) model, which is itself related to Francis Galton’s 1877
work (Mulligan, 1999). Both are heavily discussed in the literature on intergenerational
transmission and transfers (Bowles and Gintis, 2001). Intergenerational correlation of
income, wealth, consumption, and education is well documented in a tremendous num-
ber of empirical studies, as shown by Mulligan (1999, Table 1). Of course, the reasons
for the intergenerational correlation of various characteristics, including educational
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attainment, may be multidimensional. The literature identifies genetic transmission,
parental care, parental abilities, parental role modeling, family income and wealth, pre-
school and school facilities, and one’s out of school environment as the most prominent
factors in determining a child’s educational achievements. A central discussion is the
’nature versus nurture’ question, i.e. whether the high correlation between parents’ and
descendants’ characteristics is mainly due to the genetic transmission of ability or to the
social environment of the descendants. No consensus exists on this question, but most
researchers agree that the answer lies mainly in the child’s given social environment,
especially the resources endowed to the parents (Checchi et al., 2008; Heckman, 2008).
Speaking specifically of educational attainment, the literature at hand shows that par-
ents’ education is the most important factor explaining the educational attainment of
children (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995). The main difficulty in testing the ubiquity of
this result is the fact that many datasets do not provide adequate information; when
we do have a dataset that contains educational information of both the parents and
descendants, it often lacks many human capital variables which we would use to control
for abilities of descendants to estimate direct causal effects in educational transmission
(Dardanoni et al., 2008). Nevertheless, it remains unclear if abilities, even tested at a
young age, are not already formed by the social environment and especially parental
education. With respect to strategies to control for parents’ unobserved endowments
in order to identify total causal effects, it remains unclear if parents’ child rearing abil-
ities of twins (parent-generation) are identical (Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2002) or, in
the case of adoptee datasets, if the process of adoption is random or if there is some
selection which would be comparable to inheritable abilities (see Plug, 2004). Further-
more, different approaches to control for parental endowment can lead to different and
contradictory results (Holmlund et al. 2008). Given the difficulty in measuring cau-
sation within the intergenerational persistence framework, analyzing intergenerational
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correlation instead seems to be valuable, even in the face of the possibility that the
relationship between the education level of parents and their children could be overes-
timated. Therefore, our estimates are to be interpreted as correlations, not as direct or
total causal effects.
There is also a substantial body of literature in sociology dealing with inheritance
of inequalities across generations for different countries (D’Addio, 2007). Sociologists
have been mainly concerned with the intergenerational transmission of attitudes and
values. Loehlin (2005) estimates the correlations between parents and their children’s
personality traits, attitudes, values and interests across various family types and finds
a significant positive correlation for attitudes, values and interests. Osborne-Groves
(2005) reviews estimates of intergenerational correlation of personality traits in ’or-
dinary families’ based on several studies and argues that personality traits are both
persistent across generations and relatively stable over time. Bourdieu (1984) empha-
sizes the relevance of economic, cultural and social capital for the reproduction of class
inequality, but in his framework, individuals are not assumed to follow self-interested
strategies in a rational agent sense as they are in economics but instead their habitus2
, a basic concept of Bourdieu’s sociological theory.
With respect to the particular institutional arrangements of Austrian society and ed-
ucation, there are several studies that document the continuing educational expansion
in Austria. Since the Monarchy, there has been a continuing positive trend - with some
phases of stagnation and an interruption during the Second World War - towards higher
education. Beginning with the cohorts of the mid to late 1950s who started primary
school in the early to mid 1960s, we see a constant educational expansion starting with
2In Bourdieu’s work, habitus is a system of dispositions (perception, thought and action). The
individual agent develops these dispositions in response to the determining structures (such as class,
family, and education) and external conditions (fields) they encounter. They are therefore neither
wholly voluntary nor wholly involuntary.
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around 6% for Matura3 and higher education and reaching 25% and more in the 1990s
(Steiner, 1998). There are studies dealing with social selection in the Austrian schooling
system based on school statistics. In general, Austrian school statistics do not allow for
analyses of the influence of social background (e.g. education of parents), except for
university students (Landler, 1997). Other studies, as Bacher (2003) shows, use survey
data of adolescents living with their parents to analyze social selection in secondary
schools. Both approaches allow for a detailed analysis of their subjects but are limited
in two ways: they do not include the whole population and they do not include the
entire educational system.
The study that is most closely related to our analysis is that of Spielauer (2004), which
analyses the intergenerational educational transmission within families and finds that
there is considerable intergenerational persistence of educational attainment, a result
with counteracts the strong educational expansion over the past several decades. One
drawback of Spielauer’s approach is that he uses the maximum of both fathers’ and
mothers’ education to analyze the effect of parents’ education on the child’s probability
of attending different school types and having various educational outcomes. There-
fore, it is not possible to compare either the influence of mothers’ education with the
influence of fathers’ education, or same-gender parent-descendant relationships with
cross-gender parent-descendant relationships. The main aim of Spielauer’s study is to
analyze school choices and educational paths, and to compute a projection of the dis-
tribution of educational attainment of the society. In contrast, our focus lies on the
educational outcome and how it is transmitted from one generation to the next. Our
study includes, as in Spielauer’s sample, a reasonably good representation of the whole
population and therefore the whole educational system, and includes an important anal-
ysis by gender of parent and child. Furthermore, the selected empirical strategy allows
3Matura is more or less comparable to high-school (upper secondary education)
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- at least partly - for international comparisons.
We know of only limited literature that looks specifically at the gendered aspects (with
respect to parents and descendants) of the transmission of educational attainment, and
none that emphasize the importance of gender in the topic of intergenerational per-
sistence. Dardanoni et al. (2008) found a significant father to son causal effect of
parental schooling and an insignificant weak effect of mothers on daughters. Dearden
et al. (1997) looked at earnings and educational transmission of both parents to their
children in the UK, and found that fathers’ education level has a stronger effect on the
outcomes of their sons, while that of mothers has a stronger effect on the outcomes of
their daughters. Moen et al. (1997) investigated the transmission of gender roles from
mothers to daughters, and find a positive correlation that has decreased since the 1960s.
This finding - as well as those in the sociological literature (see above: Bourdieu, 1984;
Loehlin, 2005; Osborne Groves, 2005) - could be relevant in our case; if a mother has
a certain view about women’s education in general, she may pass that ideology along
to her daughter. We hypothesize that the relationship between parents and children of
the same gender will be stronger than the cross-gender relationship, in part because of
this preservation of gender role ideology between parents and their children. Not only
do parents teach their ideas about gender roles (what is expected of men and women)
to their children, but their own educational experiences could have affected their no-
tions about gender expectations, strengthening the connection between the educational
attainment of parents and their same-gender children.
We further expect - in line with Spielauer (2004) - that both males and females will have
had more mobility over time which maybe partly due to legislative changes and invest-
ments in the Austrian education system, and we expect females to have experienced
greater educational gains over time that could be partly due to the feminist movement,
which has changed gender ideology and encouraged females to pursue education. In the
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few years from 1970 onwards, the Austrian government changed the educational system
dramatically.
In June 1971 the parliament passed the 4th school organization amendment. The cen-
ter of the amendment was the abolition of the entrance exam into grammar school
(Allgemeine Höhere Schule). However, the division between secondary modern school
(Hauptschule) and grammar school (Allgemeine Höhere Schule) at the age of 10 is still
in place and might be relevant for a relatively low level of educational mobility (see
Spielauer 2004) up to date. In 1971, free public transportation for pupils was intro-
duced in order to open access to educational channels that lead with greater probability
to higher education for lower social classes (grammar schools are concentrated in cities
or larger villages whereas modern secondary schools are wider spread). In the au-
tumn of 1972, pupils received free school books for the first time. Two years later, on
September 1, 1974, a new school organizational law (Schulorganisationsgesetz) brought
some limitation of the rights of the teachers and an improvement of the rights of the
pupils. Concerning university education, a law passed in 1972 abolished all costs for
studying (at least for Austrian citizens and citizens from developing countries) but
also heavily increased scholarship funding. Along with those changes, the structure
of university organization was notably democratized. The new University Organiza-
tion Law (Universitätsorganisationsgesetz) brought students and university assistants
a say in the university organization. This new law was brought into effect in April
1975, against the vote of the more conservative parties (Österreichische Volkspartei
and Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs). It seems that women especially benefited from
these policy measures, perhaps because the new policies were particularly helpful for
low-income households and those that spent less on education in general. Given the
lower average educational attainment of women during and before the 1970s, it is clear
that the parents of this generation invested more in the education of their sons than in
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their daughters. We therefore speculate that the educational reforms allowed women to
receive higher education without a monetary strain on their families. However, although
it appears clear that the reforms had an effect on women’s educational attainment, the
magnitude of the causal effect of the reform cannot be measured by our approach (nor
with our limited dataset) and we suggest further research on the effect of these policies.
Alongside political reforms in the educational system, the feminist movement may have
played an important role in promoting women’s education and changes in persistence of
educational traits between generations, by challenging traditional gender roles. In this
respect the first half of the 1970s marked a turning point: the first autonomous femi-
nist movement AUF (Aktion Unabhängiger Frauen) formed in the early 1970s in Vienna
and founded their own magazine in 1974. The formation took place in the struggle for
the liberalization of anti-abortion laws, where the autonomous feminist movement and
women from the communist party and social democratic party worked together in order
to legalize abortion. In 1975 the so called Fristenlösung, a law which legalized abortion
up to a certain age of the fetus, was installed. In 1973 the tax system was changed
towards a individual concept, whereas before it was a family based concept, where the
woman’s income (if married) was always part of the total family income and therefore
in terms of taxes never recognized as an individual. In 1975 the Familienrechtsreform
(Reform of Family Rights) passed the Parliament, which included for the first time full
legal equal rights for men and women. Furthermore, in 1975 a law was passed which
allowed for real estate ownership to be split among more than just one person, which
led to many more women legally owning homes. Beginning in 1976 (with the passage of
a new law called Unterhaltsvorschulgesetz), the state makes alimony payments when a
father eludes to pay, and the state enforces the debt of the father, which makes divorce
much easier for women. Furthermore, the marriage law was significantly changed in
1976, when equal legal rights for both partners were introduced. Since 1977, women
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are allowed to keep their name after marriage or combine the names of the partners.
Since 1978 both parents have the same child custody rights. In 1979, a law for the
enforcement of equal pay for equal work was installed - discrimination in collective bar-
gaining agreements are forbidden. Also in 1979, women’s policy got institutionalized
by creating the first state secretary for women’s rights concerns (Staatssekretariat für
allgemeine Frauenfragen). In the following years, several more legal measures in order
to foster equal rights were introduced. Further, in the cultural and public spheres,
the feminist movement played an increasingly important role from the 1970s onwards,
resulting in a diversity of organizations, projects, initiatives, political activist groups,
women’s centers, magazines, and libraries dealing with feminist issues. In the academic
sphere as well, change is coming, although complete equality is far from having been
achieved. The higher the positions in the academic sphere, the slower the change occurs:
while in 1977 the share of female university assistants was around 22%, it increased to
around 35% in 2007. Concerning professorships, the share increased from around 2%
in 1977 to around 15% in 2007 (BMWF 2007). We assert that these vast changes to
women’s rights and autonomy had some positive effect on women’s opportunity and
motivation to obtain an education and helped to close the gender gap in educational
attainment in Austria.
1.3 Empirical Analysis
1.3.1 Data
To analyze intergenerational processes, one needs data incorporating information on
at least two generations, usually a descendant and his or her parents. There are few
Austrian datasets containing this information for a representative sample of descen-
dants. The present study is based on empirical data collected for the Household Survey
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on Housing Wealth 2008 (HSHW 2008) of the Austrian Central Bank (Oesterreichische
Nationalbank), which was conducted as a pilot project for a planned comprehensive Eu-
rosystem household survey4 . It is a representative household survey investigating the
housing wealth of Austrian households, with a 65.1% response rate. The respondents
were either the owners or tenants of the respective household’s real estate at the time of
the interview. The survey focuses on the ownership of the respective house/apartment
and of additional real estate belonging to any of the household members as well as on the
related liabilities owed by the household. Furthermore, detailed socio-economic char-
acteristics and data concerning intergenerational transfers in connection with housing
wealth are compiled from these data. The questionnaire contains a total of 168 ques-
tions, 28 of which are related to socio-economic characteristics (additionally, 8 questions
had to be answered personally by the interviewers themselves). The HSHW 2008 uses
a stratified multistage cluster address random sample5. It was carried out using a
computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) method, which allows for immediate
plausibility checks during the course of the interview, thus making it possible to cor-
rect for inconsistencies right away. The survey was conducted in January, February
and March of 2008 with fieldwork taking approximately nine weeks. Comprehensive
follow-up research was carried out until September 2008. The interviewee was asked
to state the educational level of his or her mother and father. Out of the 2081 total
observations, we use only 1892 observations for respondents aged 25 and older who have
no missing information regarding their own education or the education of their mothers
or fathers6. To check the validity of our data we first compare our variable of interest
4The HSHW 2008 was conducted by the Institute for Empirical Social Studies (IFES). For In-
formation on the planned Eurosystem Household Survey on Finance and Consumption (HFCS) see
http ∶ //www.ecb.int/home/html/researcher_hfcn.en.html.
5See Wagner and Zottel (2009) for further details.
6For 50 observations fathers education is missing and for 37 observations mothers education is
missing. Age is missing for one descendant and 127 descendants are younger than 25. Due to overlaps
of some of the observations we have to exclude only 189 observations.
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- educational attainment of the population - with another reliable source. Table 1.1
compares the descendants’ educational distribution of males and females with actual
population statistics of Statistics Austria7 . The distributions are reasonably close to
each other; for each of the five categories reported the ordering of males and females is
the same. The differences, however small, can be explained by several factors. First,
the data of Statistics Austria is based on a survey as well, and therefore both surveys
deliver just an estimate of the true distribution. Second, we use only the observations of
descendants for whom we have an age and who are not missing information about their
parents’ education. Third, in our selected sample all people above the age of 25 are
included, whereas Statistics Austria just reports Education for the Population between
25 and 64. If we restrict our sample to the people of age 25 to 64, our distributions are
even closer to those of Statistics Austria, but for the purpose of our analysis, restricting
our sample to people between those ages is not helpful and it only results in a loss of
observations.
Table 1.1: Comparison of Educational Distribution of Descendants in the Survey
HSHW 2008 Statistics Austria 2008
Male % Female % Male % Female %
Low Education max. Compulsory
school level
13.7 19.7 12.5 22.3
Apprenticeship or
vocational school
degree
45.5 37.8 51.4 30.3
Medium Education Medium-level or
technical school
13.5 16.8 8.9 18.7
Matura and higher
level vocational
school
13.9 16.0 15.7 18.9
High Education University, Fach-
hochschule
13.4 9.7 11.5 9.8
To further evaluate the validity of our data concerning educational attainment in
7Statistics Austria, Microcensus 2008.
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combination with the age structure of descendants and their parents, we calculate de-
scriptive statistics for different age groups of descendants. For reasons of comparability,
the goal of our analysis, and the limited number of observations, we form four age groups
and report educational attainment (for now) as the share of people with Matura and
higher education - as in Steiner (1998, Table 1.2), for example. We formed age groups
as follows: those born before 1945, which was the end of the Second World War; those
born between 1945 and 1959, which includes the cohorts before or at the edge of the
start of the educational expansion (see e.g. Steiner 1998); those born between 1960-
1969, the first category to clearly benefit from school reforms in the 1960s and university
reforms in the 1970s; and those born between 1970-1983, the second category to benefit
from the educational expansion. The different time spans for our age categories do not
matter for the following analysis and are just established for interpretational reasons
(i.e. two before and two after the start of the strong educational expansion), reasons
of inclusion of the whole sample (e.g. 1970-1983 instead of 1970-1979 to include all
descendants aged 25 or older), and reasons of sample size (which is, as an example, too
small to produce meaningful age categories of 5-year cohorts).
The average age of descendants in our selected sample is 50 years old and it is
the same for females and males. In the oldest age category (those born before 1945),
the average female is slightly older than her male counterpart, which might be due
to the higher life expectancy for females. Further, the age structure of the parents
seems to be reasonable: for those in the oldest age category, the average age difference
between descendants and their fathers is about 26-27 years while it is about 23-25 years
between descendants and their mothers. The difference in age between generations
increases for the younger age categories. The average difference between the age of the
fathers and the mothers is about 2-4 years for all age categories. Concerning educational
attainment, those in the descendant population generally have higher levels of education
16
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than their parents. Furthermore, fathers are generally more educated than mothers and
the steady expansion of educational attainment is clearly visible for both genders - but
stronger for females. In all these aspects, the data tie in with previous studies about
the educational expansion in Austria (e.g. Steiner 1998).
1.3.2 Univariate Analysis
As discussed above, the education level of a child depends on many factors. However,
most studies exploring the intergenerational transmission of education concentrate on
the correlation between parents’ and descendants’ educational attainment. This is be-
cause most data do not include good measures of social environment, parental care,
or wealth. As a result, most studies have to assume that educational achievement in-
cludes the other aspects, at least in part. The general functional form of the following
estimations will therefore be Edi = Edi (Efi ,Emi ,Cdi ) for i = 1,2, . . . ,N , where Edi ,Efi ,Emi
describes the individual educational attainment of an individual from the descendant
pool and her father’s or mother’s education respectively, and Cdi are additional charac-
teristics of an individual belonging to the descendant population.
Univariate Analysis - OLS and Correlation. In order to be able to compare our
results with those of other countries, we use univariate methods. Such techniques have
been heavily used to analyze intergenerational transmission of educational attainment
for a large number of countries (Chevalier et al., 2003; Hertz et al. 2007). Following
the approach by Checchi et al. (2008), we estimate OLS regressions of the form
Edi = α + βEpi + εi for i = 1,2, . . . ,N, (1.3.1)
where p = f (father) in the first estimation and p = m (mother) in the second
estimation. Furthermore εi is assumed to be a normally distributed error term with
18
zero mean and σ2 variance. The OLS estimate for each regression is
βˆ = σdp
σ2p
= ρdpσd
σp
,
where σd, σf , σm are the standard deviations of education of the relevant popula-
tions and ρdp is the correlation coefficient between descendants and fathers (p = f) or
mothers (p = f) education. A decreasing βˆ over time represents greater descendant
independence in their educational outcomes vis-à-vis their parents. To ensure that a
possible decrease or increase in βˆ is not due solely to an evolution of the distributions
of the educational attainments - namely the term σdσp - one can normalize the individ-
ual educational attainment variables by the corresponding standard deviations. This
process provides an intuitive correlative interpretation, and leads to
Edi
σd
= α + γEpi
σp
+ εi for i = 1,2, . . . ,N (1.3.2)
where the changes in γ over the separately estimated age categories can be inter-
preted as the evolution of the correlation between parents’ and descendants’ education
levels. Note that for this exercise we had to transfer the categorical variables into statu-
tory schooling years, i.e. the years which are at least necessary to complete a certain
educational degree8.
Furthermore, as our data do not allow for instrumental variable estimation, the interpre-
tation of the level of the estimates may be biased in relation to a causal interpretation
due to the lack of controls for parental care, parental ability, social environment and
other related but missing factors. Regardless, a causal interpretation of the changes
8In doing so we use all the categorical information available and replace them with appro-
priate statutory schooling years: maximum compulsory school=9, apprenticeship and vocational
school=10, medium technical school=11, Matura and higher vocational school=12.5, University and
Fachhochschule=16. Due to the complex educational system it is not unambigously clear which values
would be the most appropriate. However we tested a set of reasonable values and the results are fairly
robust.
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Figure 1.1: Educational Regression- and Correlation Coefficients over Age Categories
over time would be valid under the assumption that the influences of the possible bi-
asing factors are time invariant. Of course this assumption is highly speculative and
therefore a correlative interpretation - as we have pointed out above - is in order. Fig-
ure 1.1 shows the estimated coefficients of intergenerational educational transmission
of Models 1 and 2 with (i) fathers’ education level as the independent variable and (ii)
mothers’ education level as the independent variable .
The dependence of the educational attainment of the descendants on their parents’
educational accomplishments decreased significantly over time. In other words, children
starting school more recently have had greater educational mobility. The fact that we
find higher β coefficients for the mothers’ regressions than for the fathers’ regressions
but the reverse for the γ coefficients shows that a large portion of the β coefficient is due
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to differences in the distributions9. Overall, fathers’ as well as mothers’ education cor-
relates significantly - in terms of β and γ coefficients, which all are significantly different
from zero at a 1% significance level - with their descendants’ education. The correla-
tion has decreased over time, with the sole exception of the coefficients for mothers,
which increased slightly from the age category 1945-1959 to the age category 1960-1969
but decreased sharply to the age category 1970-1983. Disregarding distributional dif-
ferences of the population and their changes over time the correlation between fathers
and descendants is higher than that between mothers and descendants. Furthermore,
the β coefficients decreased more dramatically than the γ coefficients, implying that
we would overstate the decrease in the level of persistence if we did not control for the
distributional differences over age categories resulting from the educational expansion
in that period. This result offers further justification as to why it is appropriate to split
the sample in 4 age categories and estimate the coefficients on the different age subsets,
instead of using a single estimation with dummies for age categories. Furthermore,
for an analysis regarding the evolution of intergenerational transmission over time, it
is important to avoid the different sizes of birth-cohorts, which would have different
weights for the overall results. Of course in that sense it would be better to have even
more subsets of age categories, but only if the sample size were large enough.
With respect to the trend and magnitude of the evolution of the coefficients, our results
are in line with those of Checchi et al. (2008) for Italy. Compared to measures esti-
mated10 by Hertz et al. (2007) our results seem to be quite reasonable as well. Their
estimated β coefficient for Italy is 0.67, 0.58 for Sweden and the Netherlands, 0.54 for
9The starting level of the standard deviations of statutory schooling years in the oldest age cohort is
clearly lower for the mothers than for the fathers, and the standard deviation of all (mothers, fathers,
and descendants) is rising over time. The standard deviation of the mothers’ population rises strongly
but remains the lowest in all four subsets. The different evolution of standard deviations explains the
evolution of the differences between the β and γ coefficients.
10For their estimation, Hertz et al. (2007) used the average years of school of fathers and mothers
and calculated overall coefficients by averaging cohort coefficients.
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Slovenia, 0.48 for Finland, and 0.46 for the USA. The correlation estimate γ (disre-
garding distributional changes) is 0.54 for Italy, 0.52 for Slovenia, 0.46 for the USA,
0.40 for Sweden, 0.36 for the Netherlands and 0.33 for Finland, where all results are
averages of estimated coefficients over age categories. We ran the same regressions pre-
sented above, with the addition of a gender dummy variable equal to one for the female
descendant and zero for the male (results not shown). For the two age categories with
descendants born before 1960, being female had a significant negative impact on the
educational outcome of the descendant in the father regression. In the other models,
this result holds only for the oldest age category (those born before 1945). The effect
is negative but insignificant for all those born in or after 1960, a result documenting
the steeper rise of the educational expansion for women. The inclusion of the gender
dummy variable hardly influences the coefficients for the educational transmission of
education; it changes the coefficients only at the third place after the decimal point.
This result documents that the level of education and persistence of education over
generations needs to be clearly distinguished in analyses of educational attainment.
The fact that there is a strong educational expansion does not imply that mobility at
the end of the expansion will be higher than before or that women are less or more
dependent now on the education of their parents (father and/or mother), even in light
of the fact that the educational gap is closing. We will therefore turn to our main goal,
analyzing the relationships of same-gender and cross-gender intergenerational transmis-
sion of educational attainment. One well established approach to gain further evidence
on intergenerational transmission is the Markovian approach11.
11For Markovian approach theory relevant to intergenerational transmissions and transfers, see e.g.
Shorrocks (1978), Geweke (1986), and Van de Gaer (2001). See Norris (1997) for theory on Markov
Chains.
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1.3.3 Markovian Approach
In this section we calculate right stochastic matrices for the transitions of the Marko-
vian process which describes the intergenerational educational transmission. For the
reader’s convienience we recall the basic framework as well as the basic measurement
issues concering the markovian approach for analysing intergenerational transmission
of education.
Let E be a finite state space, where ei ∈ E are the states and e is the number of
states. Let P = [pij] ∈ Re×e+ be a stochastic matrix where the probability of moving from
state ei to state ej is defined as Pr(j∣i) = pij ≥ 0, given by the element in row i and
column j of the matrix P . Of course, ∑ej=1 pij = 1, meaning that every origin state leads
to some final state with probability 1.
In the present case, the states ei are given by the set of different educational levels.
Ef denotes the row vector which gives the marginal distribution of the education levels
of the fathers, Em denotes that of the mothers, and Ed is that of the descendants.
Therefore, a row vector pi1, pi2, . . . , pie is the educational "lottery" faced by a descen-
dant whose father or mother belongs to educational class i.
The survey question provides six different school levels12 , which we aggregated
into three classes of educational attainment13, already defined in table 1.1. Given the
transition matrix, we calculate several different measures of mobility. Consider the
following simple example which illustrates the intuition for this approach:
121. No degree; 2. Compulsory school level; 3. Apprenticeship or vocational school degree; 4.
Medium-level or technical school; 5. Matura and higher level vocational school; 6. University, Fach-
hochschule
13We call the classifications "low" (1-3), "medium" (4-5) and "high" education (6). For a detailed
discussion of the Austrian Educational System in an economic context, see Fersterer (2001).
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Example. Let us suppose a simple example in which we have a population of six
fathers and six descendants. Education levels are only low or high. Three fathers have
low education and three fathers have high education, while three descendants have low
education and three descendants have high education. Let us assume that one descen-
dant has more education than her father and one descendant has less education than
her father. The transition probability is given by Pr(j∣i) = pij = wij/∑ej=1wij, where wij
is the sum of the weights for father-descendant pairs associated with educational tran-
sition from educational class i to class j for i, j = 1,2, . . . , e. The associated transition
matrix P is therefore given by
P = ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
p1,1 p1,2
p2,1 p2,2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
2/3 1/3
1/3 2/3
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
which gives the transition from the educational distribution of the fathers population
to the educational distribution of the descendant population. In this case, it is
[3 3]´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
Ef
×⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
2/3 1/3
1/3 2/3
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
P
= ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
3
3
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦dcurly
Ed
.
We use HSHW 2008 data to construct analogous vectors of educational distributions.
The vectors Ef , Em, and Ed and the corresponding transition matrices (by rows and
columns) P f→d (table 1.3) and Pm→d (table 1.4) are ordered from high (e1) to low (e3)
education levels.
The transition matrix P f→d shows that, for example, a descendant whose father
holds the highest degree has a 0.5 probability of holding also the highest degree, and a
0.95 probability of obtaining at least a medium level education. For a descendant of a
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Table 1.3: Transition Matrix of Fathers and their Descendants
Descendant’s Education
High Medium Low
Father’s Education High 0.50 0.45 0.05
Medium 0.24 0.54 0.22
Low 0.06 0.24 0.70
Table 1.4: Transition Matrix of Mothers and their Descendants
Descendant’s Education
High Medium Low
Mother’s Education High 0.45 0.50 0.05
Medium 0.29 0.52 0.19
Low 0.07 0.26 0.67
father with a "low" level of education, the same probabilities are 0.06 and 0.3, respec-
tively. The transition matrix Pm→d appears to exhibit fairly similar trends. However,
summing up the diagonal of the matrices gives 1.74 for P f→d and 1.64 for Pm→d, provid-
ing the first hint for stronger persistence of descendants’ education coming from fathers’
level of education.
One way of ordering the lotteries that any two descendants are facing given their
parents’ education is the stochastic dominance ordering. Let pi denote the row vector of
the ith row of a right stochastic transition matrix P . Let us assume an "at least as good
as" preference relation ⪰ on educational lotteries. In the sense of stochastic dominance
the lottery pi is "at least as good as" lottery pj if pi,1+pi,2+⋯+pi,k ≥ pj,1+pj,2+⋯+pj,k ∀ k =
1,2,⋯ , e− 1 and "better" (≻) if at least one inequality holds. In the case of P f→d (and
Pm→d) this translates to p1 ≻ p2 ≻ p3. Therefore, the transition matrix is said to be
monotone because ∀ i = 1,2,⋯ , e − 1, ∑kj=1 pi,j ≥ ∑kj=1 pi+1,j, ∀ k = 1,2,⋯ , e − 1. Put
simply, let us choose two people from the descendant population whose fathers have
different education levels. The following statement is always true: The one with the
more highly educated father faces a "better" lottery in the stochastic dominance sense.
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To investigate the cross- and same-gender patterns of the transmission of educational
attainment, we calculate the following transition matrices, all of which turned out to be
monotone: P f→dd , P f→ds , Pm→dd and Pm→ds where dd and ds are the female (daughters)
and male (sons) subsets, respectively, of the set of the descendants population.
Mobility Measures. Shorrocks (1978) provides a general framework for measuring
mobility when data are provided in the form of a transition matrix. In general, those
measures can be defined as continous real functions of the form M(⋅) ∶ P ↦ R over the
set of transition matrices P .
Generally, there are two ways of analyzing mobility: mobility as movement and
mobility as independence. In the former, a measure of mobility prefers those mobility
matrices which incorporate more movement to those which incorporate less movement.
If mobility is defined as independence, on the other hand, a mobility measure prefers
those mobility matrices which incorporate less unequal lotteries to those which incor-
porate more unequal lotteries. In this sense, independence can also be interpreted as
"equality of opportunity".
To follow an independence approach, which requires that the highest mobility is
achieved if a matrix induces perfect origin independence, it is convenient to assert that
M(I) ≤ M(P ) ≤ M(P¯ ), where I ∈ P is the identity matrix, P ∈ P is any transition
matrix, and P¯ ∈ P is a transition matrix whose rows are identical. The identity matrix
generates no transition between states and should be assigned with the least level of
mobility. The matrix P¯ ∈ P , on the other hand, should be assigned the highest level of
mobility, because it induces perfect origin independence (Fields and Ok, 1996; Prais,
1955). Of course, this property is not always desirable- especially when mobility is
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defined as movement. However, for an intergenerational framework, such a conception
is relevant because we consider mobility to be independence. For convenience, the mea-
sures are normalized to the intervall [0,1]. Van de Gaer et al. (2001) show that because
the axioms introduced by Shorrocks (1978) are inconsistent on the full domain of P14,
the standard measures are not appropriate to measure mobility defined as independence
on the full domain of P . Van de Gaer et al. (2001) introduce suitable measures for the
full domain of P but since we only have to deal with monotone transition matrices, we
can restrict our set to Ξ ⊂ P , which contains only monotone transition matrices in order
to be able to use conventional measures (Fields and Ok, 1996; Van de Gaer et al., 2001).
Pursuing an analysis of the independence measurement in our transition matri-
ces, we turn to four related but unique tools. One widely used measure of the in-
dependence family of indices is the Second Eigenvalue Index. The eigenvalues of a
given transition matrix ordered by the absolute value of their real part are given by
λi = ∣λ1∣ ≥ ∣λ2∣ ≥ . . . ,≥ ∣λn∣. Every transition matrix has λ1 = 1. The Second Eigenvalue
Index measures the distance of any given transition matrix to the origin independent
matrix P¯ ; it is given by MSE(P ) ≡ 1 − ∣λ2∣. If λ2 is equal to zero, then the transition
matrix is equivalent to the limiting origin independent matrix. Therefore MSE equals
1 when the outcome distribution is independent of the original distribution. If, on the
other hand, MSE equals 0, then the educational attainment of the descendant popula-
tion is perfectly determined by the educational attainment of the parent population.
A second measure in this family of indices is the measure proposed by Shorrocks
14The relevant axioms are
(i) Monotonicity : P ≻ P ′ when pij ≥ p′ij∀i ≠ j and pij > p′ij for some i ≠ j. Therefore M(P ) >M(P ′).
(ii) Immobility : M(I) = 0. Minimum should be reached for identity matrix.
(iii) Perfect Mobility : Let P ′′ = (1/n)uu′ where u is an n-dimensional vector of ones. Then ∀P ≠ P ′′ ∈ P
it follows that M(P ′′) >M(P )
Clearly (i) and (iii) are inconsistent on the domain of P
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(1978)15. Based on the trace of the transition matrix, this index evaluates the concen-
tration arround the diagonal of the matrix: MS(P ) ≡ e−trace Pe−1 . We use the Determinant
Index, given as MD(P ) ≡ 1− ∣det(P )∣1/n−1 as our third index fullfilling Shorroks axioms
on Ξ. It is related to the average magnitude of the moduli of the eigenvalues of P .
The three indices above provide no indication of the number of classes an average
descendant stands away from the educational class of his or her parent. Therefore we
also take a look at an ad-hoc measure which does so. The so called absolute average
jump AAJ(P ) gives the mean number of classes moved in absolute value. In our case,
AAJ(P ) ∈ [0,2]. Table 1.5 shows the selected mobility indices16 for all described tran-
sition matrices.
Table 1.5: Mobility Measures for same-gender and cross-gender parent-descendant tran-
sition matrices
Mobility Measures
Second Eigenvalue Shorrocks Determinant Absolute Average Jump
Father’s to Sons 0.402 (4) 0.588 (4) 0.632 (4) 0.441 (4)
Father’s to Daughters 0.441 (2) 0.657 (2) 0.733 (2) 0.464 (2)
Mother’s to Sons 0.463 (1) 0.765 (1) 0.811 (1) 0.564 (1)
Mother’s to Daughters 0.437 (3) 0.626 (3) 0.677 (3) 0.453 (3)
Indices with rank in parentheses (1=most mobile)
All of the indices lead to exactly the same ranking, which is quite remarkable for
these indices and is quite a strong result. The most mobile, and therefore the most
independent, is the relationship between the education of sons in relation to that of
their mothers. The next most independent is females in relation to their fathers. The
15Sometimes referred to as Shorrocks Mean Exit Time or Prais Index.
16Of course there exists a wide range of further indices within the family of indices which full-
fill Shorrocks (1978) axioms on Ξ and also a number of further ad-hoc indices and other measures
of rank-correlation. For better clarity we decided to use a very restricted set of them. Most of
the indices we tried led to a equal or very similar ranking and all ranked identical over the set{P f→ds , P f→dd , Pm→ds , Pm→dd}.
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strongest dependence is between male descendants and their fathers. Clearly, males are
more dependent on their fathers than on their mothers and females are more dependent
on their mothers than on their fathers17 . There is a strong gender-specific pattern in
the transmission of educational attainment: children are likely to follow in the footsteps
of their same-gender parent.
This finding has significant implications when thinking about the persistence of gender
inequality. Not only is there a strong intergenerational persistence in educational out-
comes that reinforces divisions across families and classes in society, but those divisions
are further deepened on the level of each individual family along gendered lines. We
might consider the intergenerational persistence of educational attainment to be on a
macro level of inequality, while the gendered persistence within families might be seen
as a micro level effect.
1.3.4 Multivariate Analysis - Ordered Logit
In order to obtain further evidence on the gender issue as well as to check for robustness
of results, we conduct a multivariate ordered logit estimation18, similar to the method
of Bauer and Riphan (2004) and Daouli et al. (2008). Educational attainment of the
descendant (Ed) split by gender are the dependent variables, while educational attain-
ment of the fathers (Ef) and mothers (Em) along with the age of the descendant are
the independent variables. For the sake of including as many observations as possible,
we pool the ages of the descendant instead of estimating the different descendant pop-
ulation subsets 19. The modes of the educational attainment are excluded for fathers’
17Of course in any approach where the educational outcome of a descendant only depends on either
his or her mother or father, we can’t control for assortative mating. This is done in the ordered logit
approach in section 1.3.4
18The possible use of a multinomial logit or generalized ordered logit approach which could be
favored leads to similarly interpretable results.
19If one uses the subsets for estimation transmissional coefficients are, as expected, lower for the
younger subsets.
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and mothers’ education to serve as reference category. For both mothers and fathers,
the mode is e3, the lowest educational category in our classification. Table 1.6 shows
the marginal effects of the ordered logit estimation evaluated at the means and modes.
The probabilities for an average descendant to obtain educational levels low, medium
and high are given in the first row of table 1.6. Having a father with a high education
level instead of low education level increases ceteris paribus the probability (in absolute
terms) of holding a high educational degree by 0.406 (40.6 percentage points; signifi-
cant at 1% level) for sons and 0.261 (26.1 percentage points; significant at 1% level)
for daughters. Having a mother with a high education level instead of a low education
level has insignificant effects for sons, and increases a daughter’s probability of holding
a medium or high educational degree by 0.246 (24.6 percentage points; significant at
1% level) and 0.087 (8.7 percentage points; significant at 10% level), respectively. All
the significant marginal effects have the expected signs: descendants with more highly
educated parents are more likely to have high levels of education themselves. Being
older leads to a lower probability of higher education and higher probability of lower
education, but these effects are significant only for females, a result that documents the
higher importance of the educational expansion for females and may be interpreted as
a hint for other important determinants (e.g. the feminist movement, reforms, etc.) for
female education in this period for which there are no controls in the model.
A father’s level of education has a stronger effect than a mother’s level of education
on descendants of both genders. Overall, the effect of mothers’ education levels on
the educational attainment of daughters is substantially higher than the effect for their
sons. Overall, the effect of fathers’ education on their sons’ education is higher than
that on their daughters . Effects are stronger when the parent population has a high,
rather than medium, level of education.
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To illustrate some of these results, figures 1.2 to 1.7 show the probabilities of reach-
ing low, medium and high education for 6 benchmark cases of different combinations
of parental educational attainment over the age of the descendants calculated from the
ordered logit models presented in table 1.6. Comparing figures 1.4 to 1.5 and 1.6 to
1.7, we see that a jump in the fathers’ education from low to high leads to a higher
probability of having a high education level for sons (in relation to daughters) and that
a change in the mothers’ education level from low to high leads to higher chances of
attaining medium or high levels of education for daughters (in relation to sons). The
result of the stronger same-gender than cross-gender relationships holds if we conduct
the regressions on two different subsets of the sample according to the age-category of
the descendants referring to the time before the educational expansion (age categories
born before 1945 and between 1945 and 1959) and during (and after) the educational
expansion (age categories born between 1960-1969 and between 1970-1983), with the
sole exception of father-son vs. father-daughter pairs for the older age categories subset.
That means that even as the differences in educational outcomes in relation to gender
are diminishing over time (see section 1.3.1 and 1.3.2), which is documented in many
studies (see e.g. Steiner 1998; Biﬄ 2002; Bacher 2003; Spielauer 2004), same-gender
versus cross-gender differences in the intergenerational transmission of educational at-
tainment seem to be quite stable to date. Note that we can neither show the influence of
fathers on their daughters versus the influence on their sons nor the influence of moth-
ers on their sons versus the influence on their daughters to be statistically significantly
different at the 5% level in a nested model, which may also have to do with different
distributional patterns over time - as they were discussed in section 3.2 - and of course
due to assortative mating and the limited number of observations. Nevertheless, the
robustness of the results in different approaches, i.e. in the Markovian approach as
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well as the consistently different patterns in the ordered logit approach over different
sample subsets (female descendants, male descendants over different age categories)
can be viewed as strong evidence for the differences in same-gender versus cross-gender
relationships of intergenerational educational attainment.
Figure 1.2: FEMALES; Mother: Low; Fa-
ther: Low
Figure 1.3: MALES; Mother: Low; Father:
Low
Figure 1.4: FEMALES; Mother: Low; Fa-
ther: High
Figure 1.5: MALES; Mother: Low; Father:
High
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Figure 1.6: FEMALES; Mother: High; Fa-
ther: Low
Figure 1.7: MALES; Mother: High; Father:
Low
1.4 Conclusions
As far as the authors know the literature, this is the first paper to focus specifically on
the gendered patterns of the intergenerational transmission of educational attainment.
We confirm the results of previous studies, documenting a persistence in the intergener-
ational transmission of educational attainment (see Hertz et al. 2007 for International
Results and Spielauer 2004 for some results on Austria). We tested the intergener-
ational persistence in several ways, all of which gave robust results. Therefore, we
can confidently assert that there is a connection between the educational level of one’s
parents’ and one’s own educational achievements. These results suggest that a more
equitable society will provide resources for children from less fortunate families so that
they may catch up with their peers educationally, because those children face barriers
to educational attainment without such public support. We assert that the state should
serve as a bridge for children from lower-income and lower-educational backgrounds to
educational achievement, when their parents cannot do so, and reference the educa-
tional reforms in Austria as an example of the positive effects of publicly supported
education.
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We also confirm the gap between male and female educational attainments, which has
been diminishing over the past century - especially since the educational expansion
beginning in the 1960s. We think that the general educational expansion and the di-
minished gender-gap are due, at least in part, to educational reforms that expanded
access to the classroom. The fact that we see a decline in the educational gap start-
ing soon after the expansion in publicly funded education and continuing over several
decades suggests that eliminating or at least lowering private costs to acquiring human
capital can help reduce the inequality in educational attainment. We also credit the
feminist movement, which has pushed for women and girls’ access to schooling and
general equality with males, while simultaneously encouraging people to question and
rethink traditional gender roles which had dictated to women that they would not ben-
efit from obtaining an education.
Our main contribution to the literature and field of feminist economics is the exposure
of the gendered differences in the process of intergenerational transmission of educa-
tional attainment. To supplement other studies that lack this important feature (e.g.
Spielauer 2004), we analyze the differences between the influence of fathers versus moth-
ers educational attainment on educational attainment of descendants, finding the result
that the education of the father is more influential for both sons and daughters, in ab-
solute terms. Still, the effect of mothers’ education on their daughters’ education is
substantially higher than its effect on the sons’ education, and the effect of fathers’
education on the sons’ education is stronger than on their daughters’ education. The
gendered result is also consistent over the different approaches we used, namely the
Markovian as well as the ordered logit approach, the latter allowing us to control for
assortative mating. To this end, we believe that the intergenerational transmission of
gender roles might be playing a significant part in the outcome of children’s education.
This topic is one for further research and discussion.
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To the extent that the results are comparable, the level of intergenerational educational
attainment correlation seems to be higher in Austria than in Northern European coun-
tries such as The Netherlands, Finland, and Sweden and closer to Southern European
countries such as Italy or Slovenia. The division between secondary modern school
(Hauptschule) and grammar school (Allgemeine Höhere Schule) at the age of 10 might
be relevant for a relatively low level of educational mobility (see Spielauer 2004) up to
date. Furthermore the low level of women in higher positions at the upper end of the
educational system - university assistants and professors - is very worrisome.
The intergenerational persistence of an outcome such as education stands as a serious
threat to the equity of a society. The results that this persistence (i) varies for different
countries, (ii) varies over time, and (iii) is constructed along gender lines, serve as strong
evidence in favor of the argument that the persistence is clearly a social phenomenon.
We are encouraged by the finding that the educational gender gap as well as the per-
sistence of intergenerational educational transmission has been diminishing over time,
and recognize the importance of strong legislation and political activism in promoting
its continual decline. Concerning the gendered aspects of intergenerational educational
transmission, more research utilizing far bigger datasets is necessary to come to con-
clusions about how strong it is and how it has developed over time. At the least, we
found strong evidence of its existence and importance for educational outcomes of the
existing Austrian population and some evidence that it is still relevant for the younger
cohorts.
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Chapter 2
Assets and Liabilities of Austrian
Households
2.1 Introduction
The liabilities of private Households have risen sharply in many OECD countries since the
mid eighties (Girouard et al. 2006). At first sight, one would think that debt-holding house-
holds (i) hold no or very little financial wealth and/or (ii) are low income households. In
other words, one might understand debt to come about as a substitute in the face of a lack of
financial resources. In this case, we are presented with a certain danger to financial stability:
households holding much debt would be quite vulnerable to adverse financial shocks, without
any financial wealth to absorb such shocks. A macro level analysis shows that both liabilities
and assets are rising, but it is unclear how this rise translates to the micro (household) level.1
Macroeconomic analyses only allow us to look at the expansion of both on an aggregate
level. There are two main problems with a macro-level analysis of financial assets (henceforth
referred to as assets) and liabilities: (i) it is rather difficult to separate true private households
1Some descriptive parts of this study are already published (Fessler and Mooslechner 2008).
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from Non-Governmental Organizations, churches and other such organizations in the National
Accounts, and (ii) we cannot know which households hold debt and which households hold
financial wealth holdings - nor can we know to what extent some of the households hold both
debt and financial wealth. We therefore need to analyse debt and asset holdings on the micro
level to analyse threats of debt to financial stability; put simply, if households holding debt
also hold certain amounts of financial assets, the risk exposure towards financial shocks is
quite low. If debt and asset holders are separate groups, the risks the risks related to financial
shocks are quite high.
Cox et al. (2002) use a descriptive analysis to show that in Great Britain, the relation
between liabilities and assets in private households decreases as asset values increase, but in
absolute terms, households with the highest wealth holdings also hold the highest amount of
debt. Aizcorbe et al. (2003) present similar results for the USA (see also Barnes and Young
(2003), Barwell et al. (2006) for the UK or Herrala (2006) for Sweden), where participation on
the credit markets and the amount of debt held by a household rises with income and wealth.
Beer und Schürz (2007) conducted a similar study for Austria, finding that higher income
household have more participation in the credit market, although their analysis of the effect
of wealth holding on debt are unclear.
It is not completely clear why households would hold large amounts of debt and large
amounts of financial wealth at the same time. In general, holding debt is expensive, because
of the interest payments due on the debt. The only situation in which it would be rational
to hold both debt and assets would be when the returns to assets are higher than the cost of
debt. If this is not the case, the rational household should use the assets to pay off the (more
expensive) debt. A situation in which returns to assets are higher than interest payments on
debt is, of course, not sustainable in the long run, so we must look for other explanations.
One possibility is that households have a preference for liquidity, and therefore accept the cost
of holding debt in order to have the liquidity provided by the assets. Another explanation is
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that their asset holdings are too illiquid for use in cutting down debt.
Recent behavioral economics literature analyzing data on credit card debt and financial
wealth holdings of US households offers another explanation for the phenomenon of holding
both assets and expensive debt simultaneously (s. Laibson et al. 2000, Laibson 1997). Laibson
et al. 2000 suggest that households face hyperbolic discounting, meaning that the discount
rate for the near future is higher than the long term discount rate (dynamically inconsistent
time preferences), and that encourages households to delay eliminating their debt.
This paper analyzes the extent to which households hold both assets and liabilities. It
is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the correlation between assets
and liabilities on macro level. In Section 2.3 we present the socioeconomic characteristics of
households holding consumer and housing debt. While we present some international data in
section 2.4 we concentrate on Austria in section 2.5 and employ a Heckman Selection model
to investigate the determinates of holding liabilities, both probability and level. Section 2.6
concludes.
2.2 The macro level
All financial transactions have two sides. Financial Assets on one side imply liabilities on
the other side. In most cases, the household sector has a structural surplus, meaning that
they have higher financial assets than liabilities, and the firm sector has a structural deficit,
meaning that they have higher liabilities than financial assets. In a closed economy, financial
assets and liabilities cancel each other out over all sectors. In an open economy, a deficit in
one country implies a surplus in another country, but financial assets and liabilities over all
countries sum to zero. It is therefore not surprising that both financial assets and liabilities
can increase together.
Figure 2.1 shows the increase in both household financial assets and liabilities over the
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Figure 2.1: Household financial assets and liabilities
past decade.
Macro data can not tell us anything about the distribution of assets and liabilities. A first
guess would be that assets and liabilities function as substitutes; households with low income
and low assets might need liabilities to finance their consumption. On the other hand, house-
holds often need loans to finance assets, such as real estate wealth, which would mean that
a household might have both high real assets and liabilities at the same time. Nevertheless,
economic theory suggests that large holdings of financial assets combined with large holdings
of liabilities should be less common, because interest paid on debt should on average be higher
than interest earned from financial assets (given the assumption that banks have some costs
as well).
In this following analysis, we use microdata to assess the connection between financial
assets and liabilities.
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2.3 Debtors in Austria
In this section we examine the socioeconomic characteristics of indebted Austrian Households.
We use the Survey of Austrian Households Financial Wealth (SHFW 2004), which is a repre-
sentative dataset on the financial wealth of Austrian households2. We distinguish between debt
used to buy real estate (real estate debt) from debt used to consume other goods (consumer
debt). The socioeconomic characteristics used are those of the so-called household head3.
The life-cycle hypothesis tells us that an important determinant of the demand for debt is
age. Young individuals with a high marginal utility of consumption and with an expectation
of rising income should have a high demand for debt. From a certain age onwards, one would
expect that the demand for debt decreases. Financial wealth is also an important determinant
for the demand for debt: an increase in one’s budget for financial wealth should decrease the
demand for debt. The more liquid the financial wealth is, the stronger this effect should be.
However, this is not always the case; there are situations when financial wealth and debt go
hand in hand. For example, a person interested in obtaining a loan (e.g. for buying real estate
wealth) may need to show a certain level of wealth in order to do so. This situation - of si-
multaneous financial assets and liabilities (at least for a short time) - occurs in the presence of
credit restrictions. We therefore see that the relationship of financial wealth and debt holdings
is not unambiguously clear. Nevertheless we would in general expect a negative relationship
as debt holders should reduce their debt over time and then (or already during that period)
build up financial wealth again.
Most households hold debt in order to buy real estate wealth. Real estate debt, which
most often take the form of mortgages, is generally higher than consumer debt. Most house-
2The dataset consists of 2556 observations and was sampled using a stratified clustered multistage
random sample. Listwise deletion was used, i.e. controlling for non-random item non-response is
therefore not feasible. For details see Beer et al. 2006
3In the survey, the term ‘household head’ refers to that individual in a household who is either
identified as the household head by the interviewees or the individual ’who best knows about the
financial situation of the household’
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holds (household heads) buy their real estate wealth between the ages of 30 and 39. From
this time onwards, we would expect them to start to repay their debt and to build financial
wealth again. While it is possible that some households prefer to stay liquid and hold debt and
financial wealth simultaneously, we generally expect a negative correlation between assets and
liabilities for those holding liabilities. Debt should decrease over time while financial wealth
should increase over time.
With respect to income, we expect that one’s expectations of his/her future stream of in-
come to be the most important factor in determining debt holdings. The steeper one’s income
expectations are, the higher the demand for debt should be. If the expectation about the fu-
ture stream of income is flat, there is less need to smooth consumption over the life-cycle and
the incentive to hold debt should be lower. Along with the expectations about the shape of the
future stream of income, uncertainty related to the realization of future income could play an
important role in determining debt holdings. If the probability of becoming unemployed in the
future is relatively high, the demand for debt should be lower. It remains unclear how current
household income should be related to the demand of debt. On the one hand, a low income
could be related to expectations of a steep incline of the income in the future. On the other
hand, the degree of uncertainty is typically higher for low income jobs than it is for high income
jobs. Nevertheless, higher income should generally lead to the possibility of holding more debt.
As a proxy for an expectation of the future stream of income, education could be very im-
portant. Higher education corresponds with a greater probability of having a steeper incline
of future income. Furthermore, access to credit is easier for highly educated people because
barriers to entry are smaller. Therefore, we expect education to be positively related to house-
hold debt.
Regional differences could also play an important role for the holdings of debt of households.
If lenders are less developed in certain areas, this may induce lower demand for debt because
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of higher entry barriers. Further, different regions could have different rates of unemployment,
which might reflect the probability of becoming unemployed and therefore uncertainty con-
cerning the future stream of income.
Banks verify the education level, income and wealth of their clients before they give them
a loan. Therefore, the same socioeconomic characteristics influence the demand as well as the
supply side of loans. Some households do not attempt to take out a loan, anticipating that
they will be denied on the basis of their socioeconomic characteristics.
It seems likely that various other variables, which are difficult to observe, play an important
role in the process of demanding and obtaining a loan. There may be historical and institu-
tional reasons which could influence the attitude towards real estate wealth or debt as a whole.
2.3.1 Real estate debt
Approximately 29% of Austrian Households hold real estate debt. Holding debt to finance
a house or an apartment is a more widely spread phenomenon than holding debt for other
consumption issues; only about 17% of Austrian households hold consumer debt. The average
real estate debt reaches a value of 57,708 Euro (Median: 36,000 Euro). See table 2.1 for an
overview over the distributions. The ratio of households holding real estate debt is the highest
in the 30 to 39 years age group. The probability of holding real estate debt rises with income.
Regarding the share of real estate debtors over gross financial wealth deciles4, higher financial
wealth corresponds to a higher share of debtors with a sharp decrease at the very top of the
wealth distribution. It is only in the 10th decile that the share lies below the average share
(table 2.2). Of course the share of households holding a real estate loan does not allow us to
4Gross financial wealth is defined as the sum of all values on checking accounts, savings accounts, all
other saving vehicles, bonds, stocks, mutual funds, business assets and all payments to life insurance
contracts. The inclusion of life insurance contracts does not lead to significant differences in all results
of this paper.
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Table 2.1: Percentile values of the reference group of debtors
Percentiles Consumer debt (con-
sumer debtors)
Real estate debt (real
estate debtors)
All debt (all debtors)
10 1160 7000 5000
25 5000 15000 10000
Median 10000 36000 25000
75 20000 80000 50000
90 34000 140000 125000
conclude that there is a positive correlation between financial assets and the value of the debt.
A first hint for such a relationship is given in table 2.3, which shows the average real estate
debt and the average gross financial wealth for gross financial wealth deciles. It also shows
that in higher wealth deciles, the values of real estate debts are higher, even when the average
household could eliminate its debt given the amount of financial wealth it holds. In the first
wealth decile debt is on average 18 times higher than the financial wealth of the households in
that decile. On the other hand, the value of debt is just 1/5 of the average value of financial
wealth in the highest decile. The burden for the households in the lower wealth deciles is obvi-
ously much higher than the burden for those in upper wealth deciles. This pattern could reflect
a life-cycle effect. From a theoretical point of view, though, it remains unclear why households
which could easily repay their debt do not do so, given the fact that they need to pay interest
for their debt. If life-cycle theory is applicable, households with high values of financial gross
wealth should not hold debt. Obviously, that is not the case, and it is therefore impossible
to look at the debt of a household and conclude anything about its financial assets based on
the level of debt. It is also impossible to identify rich or poor households in this way. The
households with the highest debt are the households with the highest values of financial assets.
Of course it could be that bullet loans are the reason for such a picture. However, given
the share of bullet loans in Austria, this explanation is by far not sufficient.
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Table 2.2: Socioeconomic characteristics and real estate debt
Share of real es-
tate debtors
Difference to total
value in percent-
age points
Age of the household head 18 - 29 29% 0
30 - 39 42% +13
40 - 49 39% +10
50 - 59 34% +5
60 - 69 15% -15
70 - 79 6% -24
80+ 15% -14
Net income of household up to EUR 749,- 9% -20
EUR 750,- to EUR 1.349,- 16% -13
EUR 1.350,- to EUR 2.249,- 27% -2
EUR 2.250,- to EUR 2.999,- 40% +11
EUR 3.000,- and more 40% +11
Education of household head Max. compulsory school 18% -11
Vocational school, middle
school
30% +1
High school, grammar school 31% +2
University and equivalent 33% +4
Household size 1 person 19% -10
2 persons 21% -8
3 persons 33% +4
4 persons 48% +19
5 and more persons 57% +28
Gross wealth deciles Decile 1 16% -13
Decile 2 28% -1
Decile 3 25% -4
Decile 4 27% -2
Decile 5 31% +2
Decile 6 34% +5
Decile 7 39% +10
Decile 8 36% +7
Decile 9 33% +4
Decile 10 22% -7
occupation Self-Employed (Freie Berufe) 29% -10
Entrepreneurs 32% -7
White-collar Workers 40% +1
Civil servants 39% 0
Farmers 29% -10
Blue-collar Workers 41% +2
Employed Total 39% 0
Total 29% 0
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Table 2.3: Averages for real estate debt and gross financial wealth of real estate debtors
Gross financial wealth Average real estate debt Average gross financial wealth
Decile 1 28035 1537
Decile 2 54395 5334
Decile 3 45548 8980
Decile 4 41561 13853
Decile 5 55138 20057
Decile 6 60140 28084
Decile 7 69347 39885
Decile 8 59666 55468
Decile 9 63912 82849
Decile 10 83307 368456
2.3.2 Consumer debt
As mentioned above, approximately 17% of Austrian Households hold consumer debt. The
average consumer debt amounts to 16,845 Euro (Median: 10,000 Euro) and is therefore lower
than average real estate debt. Households holding consumer debt are on average younger than
their real estate debt counterparts. It is also the case that households with consumer debt are
often higher income households. Households with consumer debt are more likely to be found
in the lower gross financial wealth deciles (table 2.4). However, even in the highest gross
financial wealth decile, more than one out of ten households holds consumer debt. Looking
at the average consumer debt versus the average gross financial wealth, the picture seems to
be close to, but less pronounced than, that for real estate debt (table 2.5). The average gross
financial wealth in the top decile is remarkably lower than for households with real estate
debt. In general consumer debt seems to be less important for the upper part of the wealth
distribution.
Credit constraints Looking at net financial wealth versus gross financial wealth, it is
clear that the lowest net financial wealth decile holds higher gross financial wealth than the
second lowest net financial wealth decile. This fact suggests that households in the lower part
of the gross financial wealth distribution do not hold much real-estate debt. This fact could
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Table 2.4: Socioecnomic characteristics and consumer debt
Share of house-
holds holding con-
sumer debt
Difference to to-
tal in percentage
points
Age of household head 18 - 29 16% -1
30 - 39 27% +10
40 - 49 22% +5
50 - 59 18% +1
60 - 69 9% -8
70 - 79 3% -14
80+ 5% -12
Net income of household up to EUR 749,- 7% -10
EUR 750,- to EUR 1.349,- 15% -2
EUR 1.350,- to EUR 2.249,- 16% -1
EUR 2.250,- to EUR 2.999,- 16% -1
EUR 3.000,- and more 24% +7
Education of household head Max. compulsory school 14% -4
Vocational school, middle
school
18% +1
High school, grammar school 19% +1
University and equivalent 16% -2
Household size 1 person 13% -4
2 persons 15% -2
3 persons 25% +8
4 persons 20% +3
5 and more persons 19% +2
Gross financial wealth decils Decile 1 26% +9
Decile 2 20% +3
Decile 3 22% +5
Decile 4 16% -1
Decile 5 14% -3
Decile 6 18% +1
Decile 7 10% -7
Decile 8 19% +1
Decile 9 15% -3
Decile 10 11% -7
occupation Self-Employed (Freie Berufe) 30.1% +4.9
Entrepreneurs 22.7% -2.5
White-collar Workers 22.8% -2.4
Civil Servants 22.7% -2.5
Farmers 6.0% -19.2
Blue-collar Workers 24.1% -1.1
Employed total 23.1% 0
Total 17% 0
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Table 2.5: Average consumer debt and average gross financial wealth of consumer
debtors
Gross financial wealth decil Average consumer debt Average gross financial wealth
Decile 1 8130 1442
Decile 2 12390 5034
Decile 3 10502 9195
Decile 4 16969 14118
Decile 5 14865 20024
Decile 6 23969 28324
Decile 7 13536 38826
Decile 8 17854 55717
Decile 9 25446 81343
Decile 10 40094 282062
be explained by age effects or credit constraints (or both), because those households may have
not enough gross wealth to get a mortgage. To take this fact into account in the econometric
analysis, it would be necessary to have some loan supply side indicators. Unfortunately, we
cannot examine this phenomenon more deeply because our dataset does not include any supply
side information concerning loans. See Crook (2003) for an analysis also including supply side
factors.
2.4 International Comparison of selected OECD coun-
tries
For international comparison we use data from the Luxembourg Wealth Study5 (LWS), which
consist of ex-post harmonized international microeconomic datasets on wealth. Figure 2.2
shows the participation rate for the debt market in selected countries. In Austria, roughly
41% of all households hold either real estate debt or consumer debt. Compared to other
countries, Austria’s rate is rather low. In Sweden and the US in particular, the participation
rate is relatively high. Germany is closest to Austria, but one ought to bare in mind that the
5http://www.lisdatacenter.org/
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Figure 2.2: LWS, http://www.lisdatacenter.org/, Percentage ratio of households hold-
ing either real estate or consumer debt
rate for Germany is biased downwards, because the German dataset only reports debt values
above 2500 Euros.
2.4.1 Empirical Results for Selected OECD Countries
In this section, we look at correlations between debt, income and financial wealth using LWS
microdata for Germany, Finland, Austria, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Total debt6 of a household h = 1, ...,H, dh consists of (secured) mortgage debt and con-
sumer debt. Consumer debt itself consists of debt for the financing of vehicles, education,
informal debt, and debt to consume other goods. We measure Total Financial Assets7 ah
6LWS-Variable TD (Total Debt).
7LWS-Variable TFA (Total Financial Assets), which consists of deposit accounts, total bonds, stocks
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and disposable household income8 wh. All values are non-negative. As defined in (2.4.1), d˜h
includes only those households which hold positive amounts of debt. Note that with regard to
total financial assets and household income we do not exclude values for which the logarithmic
function is not defined as in (2.4.1), but include as many observations as possible using (2.4.2)
instead. Analogous to (2.4.2), we treat d˜′h in table 2.69.
d˜h ≡ ln (dh) ∀ dh > 0, (2.4.1)
total debt d˜h , total financial assets a˜h and disposable income w˜h
a˜h ≡
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ln (ah) for ah > 0,
0 for ah = 0, w˜h ≡
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ln (wh) for wh > 0,
0 for wh = 0. (2.4.2)
Table (2.6) shows the correlation (Pearson) between total debt d˜h, total financial assets a˜h
and disposable income w˜h of households in the selected countries. In all cases, the correlation
between debt and income is stronger than that between debt and financial assets. Both are
significant at the 1% significance level. The second column d˜′h includes households holding no
debt. For all countries, disposable income stays positively and significantly related to debt.
For Germany, the United Kingdom and the USA, this is also the case for financial assets. In
Finland, the relationship between financial assets and debt turns to be significantly negative
and for Austria and Sweden it is statistically insignificant. This is a first hint for income
and financial assets being important determinants in the selection mechanism of holding debt
or not. Indeed, Beer and Schürz (2007) conducted a logit regression and found that higher
financial assets leads to a lower probability of holding consumer debt, but their results for
housing debt were unclear.
and mutual fonds
8LWS-Variable lis_dpi (Luxembourg Income Study Disposable Income), but exclude some negative
values of disposable income for the USA, the United Kingdom and Sweden
9No dataset contains a dh,wh, ah ∈ (0,1).
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Table 2.6: Correlations of total debt with disposable income and total financial assets
d˜h d˜
′
h (analogous to definition (2.4.2))
Germany
a˜h 0.20*** 0.03***
w˜h 0.44*** 0.39***
Finland
a˜h 0.13*** -0.07***
w˜h 0.36 *** 0.29***
Austria
a˜h 0.30*** -0.02
Sweden
a˜h 0.25*** 0.00
w˜h 0.40*** 0.45***
United Kingdom
a˜h 0.28*** 0.09***
w˜h 0.35*** 0.37***
USA
a˜h 0.29*** 0.26***
w˜h 0.47*** 0.42***∗ ∗ ∗ =,∗∗ =,∗ = denotes significance on a 1%, 5%, 10% level
With respect to the perspective on all households, the positive correlation between income
and debt as well as wealth and debt could be explained by borrowing constraints for less
wealthy households but this share of households should not be large enough to explain this
phenomenon in the data. Another possibility would be that variables other than financial
assets or income drive the relation. Even in this case, the positive correlation documents a
clearly suboptimal allocation in household portfolios. At the same time, the fact that higher
amounts of debt are held by households with higher amounts of financial assets implies lower
risks for financial stability than one could expect after perceiving decades of rising household
debt on an aggregate level.
To control for other possible determinants of the selection into debt process and the amount
of debt being held, we will turn to econometrics. The main goal is to check if the positive cor-
relation will remain if we control for other household characteristics and the selection process
of holding debt or not.
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2.5 Empirical Results for Austria
Similar analyses were done by Crook and Hochguertler (2002) as well as Crook (2003)
for OECD countries, Magri (2002) for Italy or Kohler et al. (2004) for Australia. To
analyse the factors of debt holding in Austria, we use data from the Survey on Financial
Household Wealth 2004, which is also included in the Luxembourg Wealth Study data.
The correlation of total debt and total financial assets is positive and significant (see
table 2.6). We see a strong relation between household total debt and financial assets.
To compare the distributions of total financial assets and total debt, we produce kernel
density estimates of d˜h and a˜h (see figure 2.3) for all indebted households10. To be
able to compare, we present figure 2.4, which shows a similar kernel density estimation
from Brown and Taylor (2005) for the USA11. Figure 2.3 clearly shows that nearly all
indebted households in Austria hold non-negligible amounts of financial assets, while in
the USA there exists a non-negligible part of indebted households without any (or very
small amounts of) financial assets. The distribution of total debt in the USA clearly
has stronger weight to the right of the distribution than the distribution of financial
assets. The absolute values of debt and wealth cannot be compared across the countries,
because the data are collected at different points in time, the countries operate in
different currencies, and they have different pension systems. However, we can say that
the figures clearly show that indebted households in the USA optimize their portfolios
more effectively, but that makes them more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks.
In the case of a shock on the financial capability of serving debt payments, as a negative
shock on income, unemployment, higher interest rates, or exchange rate or repayment
vehicle shocks in the case of foreign currency loans, households need other resources to
10In this section we use total financial assets including life insurance, but results are robust with and
without their inclusion
11The estimates of Brown and Taylor 2005 use only indebted households and are based on data of
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which is also part of the Luxembourg Wealth Study dataset
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serve payments (see Albacete and Fessler 2010). If enough financial wealth is available
they can draw from there financial wealth before they loose their real estate wealth,
which serves as collateral in most cases. As fire-sales of real estate property due to
macroeconomic shocks often lead to declining prices in real estate markets the value of
the collateral might in the end only pay back a small share of outstanding debt.
To further analyze the relationship between total financial assets and total debt,
our next step is to estimate a simple OLS Regression,
d˜h = α + βa˜h + γ′Wh + δ′Xh + uh. (2.5.1)
Our dependent variable is total debt d˜h, made up of housing and consumer debt.
This leaves us 991 observations holding positive amounts of debt in the Austrian dataset
(1565 households without any debt are excluded from the analysis). α is a constant.
The critical independent variables to analyze the relation between total debt and fi-
nancial assets and disposable income are the logarithm of total financial assets a˜h and
a vector of three dummy variables Wh for increasing disposable income classes. The
lowest disposable income class (up to 749 Euro) is used as reference class. Xh is a vector
of socioeconomic control variables of the household or the household head h. uh denotes
a normally distributed error term with mean zero and variance σ2. The socioeconomic
control vector includes age, age squared and dummy variables for the education of the
household head12 and a dummy for entrepreneurial-households13. We also include a
dummy variable for households which have inherited money, and a variable indicating
the number of members in the household.
We expect positive signs and increasing coefficients for the increasing disposable
12The lowest educational class is excluded as a reference category
13Entrepreneurial households are those in which at least one person holds not publicly traded business
equity.
59
Figure 2.3: Kernel Denisty Estimation - Austria : —– Total debt - - - Total financial
assets
Figure 2.4: Kernel Denisty Estimation - USA: —– Total debt - - - Total financial assets
(Brown and Talyor 2005, Figure 9)
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income dummies, as disposable income should be a good indicator for the ability to
pay back debt. We also expect the same relation for the increasing educational dum-
mies, because education should be a good indicator for the future development of an
income stream of a household. We further expect a positive sign of the coefficient for
the number of people living in a household, because this should be an indicator for the
need of living space of a household and housing debt dominates consumer debt. For age
of the household head we expect a negative sign, because the estimation just includes
households with positive debt and we know that people in their thirties start to hold
high amounts of debt financing their home ownership and older households should have
already paid back most of their housing debt. The sign of the entrepreneur dummy
and the inheritance dummy is not unambiguous. One argument could be that a en-
trepreneur is able to accumulate more debt because s/he can use the interest in business
equity as security. On the other hand, an inheritance shifts the budget constraint to
the right and should therefore lead to less demand of debt.
Because of the fact that we include only households with strictly positive amounts
of total debt and the participation in debt market is very likely to be non-random (s.
Beer and Schürz 2007), our OLS estimation could be exposed to sample selection bias.
In order to control for that we estimate equation (2.5.1) as a Heckman Selection Model
of the following form:
th = Zhδ + µh (2.5.2)
dˆh =Xhβ + εh (2.5.3)
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t∗h =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if th > 0
0 otherwise
(2.5.4)
dˆ∗h =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
dˆh if t∗h = 1
n.a. otherwise
(2.5.5)
We estimate a Heckman selection model via the maximum likelihood method, where
both equations are estimated simultaneously 14. The model uses two latent variables,
which are not observed, dˆh and th, which are dependent on two vectors of observable
independent variables. Those are Xh and Zh, where Xh consists of the same vari-
ables which we use in the OLS regression. For technical reasons the model requires
Zh to include additional variables, which influence the selection process (the 1st stage
of the model)15. In our case the dummy variable for living in Vienna or not and the
married/partner variable indicating that a spouse or partner lives in the household are
candidates for additional first-stage variables. The variable dˆh defines the latent amount
of debt and th the latent debt participation, i.e. holding debt or not. We observe t∗h as
an indicator for th > 0 and dˆ∗h = dˆh, but only if t∗h = 1. The error terms µh and εh are
assumed to be jointly normally distributed with covariance ρσε. Put simply, (2.5.2) is
a selection equation, explaining the decision to hold debt or not. Equation (2.5.3) is an
equation explaining the amount of debt which is hold. If and only if a household holds
debt, i.e. t∗h = 1, the latent amount of debt is realised, i.e. dˆ∗h = dˆh.
The difference between the Heckman selection model and a simple OLS estimation
14This type of model is also known as Tobit Type Two Model. For details on that type of model see
e.g. Vella 1998.
15This requirement is under debate concerning the maximum likelihood estimation procedure we use
here (see Vella 1998)
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is that the OLS estimation includes only households with positive debt, whereas the
Heckman selection model uses all households to estimate the desired latent amount of
debt. The selection process is modelled explicitly in the first stage.
Our main concern lies on the households which hold debt and not on the desired lev-
els of the others, i.e. the expected value E(dˆh∣Zhδ > 0) and the corresponding marginal
effects of the independent variables on the amount of debt they hold. The advantage
of the Heckman approach is that we can control for the selection process which could
lead to biased OLS estimates, because households who decide to hold debt could be
systematically different from households who do not hold debt (not only in terms of
possible credit constraints). Marginal effects can be calculated from the Heckman se-
lection model and are presented in table 2.7 jointly with the OLS results and the first
stage of the Heckman selection model. The results show, that the positiv and - at
least at a 10% level - significant effect of total financial assets on the amount of debt is
robust to controling for the selection process. Note that marginal effects corresponding
to dummy variables are effects from a discrete increase from 0 to 1.
Against our expectations, the hypothesis of a negative relation between total finan-
cial assets and the amount of debt is also rejected if one controls for a large number of
socioeconomic characteristics. This result is robust for estimators which control for the
selection process and, in this group, for resulting estimates corresponding to the total
population (i.e. including not realised desired amounts of debt) as well as corresponding
just to the households which hold debt (which are shown in table 2.7).
Besides the fact that a negative relationship between total financial assets and debt
can be rejected, the signs of the coefficients for the other variables have a meaningful
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interpretation. All significant coefficients of the OLS estimation have the same positive
sign as the corresponding coefficients in the second stage of the Heckman selection
model. In the OLS Model as well as for the marginal effects in the Heckman selection
model (conditional on holding debt), all increasing income classes enter with increasing
positive coefficients. The same is true for increasing educational classes, with the only
exception of the highest educational class which has a marginally smaller coefficient
than the second highest class, which could be explained by a later entrance in the
labour market for people with tertiary education. The difference in the effects between
these two groups is not statistically significant. The number of persons living in the
household is as expected, with a positive sign. The entrepreneur- and the inheritance-
dummy variables also have positive signs: households which have already inherited
something seem to hold - ceteris paribus - more debt. The effects of age and age
squared are not significantly different from zero in the second stage.
The Heckman Selection Model allows us to interpret the marginal effects of certain
variables on the amount of debt, which just enter the selection equation. The Vienna
dummy variable has a significant negative effect. One could argue that in Vienna, there
are many more households renting apartments and who therefore do not need real es-
tate debt.
The selection equation of the Heckman selection model shows that total financial
wealth has a significant negative impact on holding debt. The probability that a house-
hold holds debt decreases with increasing total financial assets. Income has a significant
positive impact on holding debt, which is the same as in the second stage of the model
and a logit model estimated by Beer and Schürz (2007) on the same dataset. The same
is true for education, but the education level is only significant (at the 10% level) for
the lowest (included) educational class. Age and age squared enter significantly and
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with the expected signs, age positive and age squared negative. That reflects the fact
that debt participation reaches its maximum in the age class 30-39 and decreases for
older household heads. Also consistent with this fact is that age and age squared enters
the second stage (for marginal effects including all households which are not shown the
coefficient is significant) in the opposite direction, because debt should decrease with
age because people are repaying their debt.
2.6 Conclusions
Participation in real estate debt increases with higher income and higher financial as-
sets. Participation in consumer debt increases with higher income but decreases with
total financial assets. Housing debt dominates consumer debt with respect to partici-
pation and amounts of debt hold in this debt class.
The probability of holding debt (real estate and/or consumer debt) decreases -
as one would expect - with higher total financial assets, once one controls for other
possible determinants as income, education, age, and the number of people living in a
household. For the group of households holding positive amounts of debt this negative
relationship of total financial assets and total debt is - surprisingly - rejected. The
more total financial assets an indebted household holds the higher the amount of debt -
ceteris paribus - it holds. This is a strong hint for sub-optimal allocations in household
portfolios of indebted households which goes a long with risks the households and the
society as a whole unnecessarily bears. A mechanism of substitution between total
financial assets and debt is rejected. Besides the fact that aggregate data is not useful
to illustrate and analyse the resilience of households towards certain shocks, we find
that the amount of debt a certain household holds is not enough to say anything about
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Table 2.7: Ordinary Least Squares Regression, Heckman Selection Model (Full Maxi-
mum Likelihood), Austria, Total debt
OLS Heckman Selection Model
1. Stage (Selection) 2. Stage (Amount Estimation)
E(dˆh∣Zhδ > 0) 9.919
for th > 0
Coefficient Coefficient Marginal Effects
∂dˆh / ∂x
Total Financial Wealth 0.095** -0.160*** 0.074*
(0.458) (0.023) (0.042)
monthly Net Income
Euro 750.- bis Euro 1,349.- 0.858* 0.540** 0.619
(0.516) (0.222) (0.535)
Euro 1,350.- bis Euro 2,249.- 1.169** 0.853*** 0.906*
(0.511) (0.222) (0.543)
Euro 2,250.- bis Euro 2,999.- 1.305** 1.058*** 1.021*
(0.519) (0.232) (0.543)
Euro 3,000.- und mehr 1.476*** 1.373*** 1.167**
(0.524) (0.239) (0.547)
Education
Apprenticeship, Vocational School 0.446** 0.190* 0.396**
(0.181) (0.109) (0.184)
Grammar School, Higher Vocational School 0.759*** 0.114 0.687***
(0.191) (0.119) (0.190)
Fachhochschule, University 0.622** 0.145 0.619**
(0.220) (0.132) (0.206)
Number of Persons 0.101** 0.080** 0.085**
(0.355) (0.031) (0.038)
Entrepreneur 0.288 0.152 0.302*
(0.191) (0.139) (0.172)
Inhertiance 0.250** -0.004 0.223**
(0.097) (0.067) (0.093)
Age (Household Head) 0.000 0.057** -0.019
(0.024) (0.018) (0.023)
squared Age (Household Head) 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 7.101*** -0.486
(0.796) (0.455)
Variables from Selection Stage
Vienna -0.279*** -0.283***
(0.053) (0.061)
married/partner -0.086 -0.086
(0.077) (0.077)
R-Squared 0.19
LR χ2 [p-value] -1763.572 [0.000]
Wald,H0 ∶ ρ = 0 [p-value] 74.29 [0.000]
censored n 1565
n 991 991
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the vulnerability of the household. Indebtedness of households needs to be analysed
jointly with real- and financial assets of households. Given the empirical evidence of our
analysis, it is quite likely that households with lower amounts of debt (consumer debt)
which are neither covered by real- or financial assets could be more vulnerable than
households with higher debt levels. On the other hand, that implies that household
debt imposes a relatively small risk for financial stability, because the relatively low
amounts of (consumption) debt which could trouble the households do not aggregate
to amounts which could trouble banks.
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Chapter 3
The Role of Data Production in
Survey Analysis
3.1 Introduction
A large amount of economic research is based on analysis of observed data; this paper discusses
some aspects of the relationship and disconnect between data collection and data analysis. It
is usually the case that the data collectors are not the same individuals as those analysing the
data, and in nearly all cases, collected data is heavily influenced by the individuals gathering
the data. This fact is quite obvious for survey data, because survey data often comes from
interviewers who directly gather information from respondents.
Nevertheless the same is true for so called register data. Also for register data it is true that
either individuals gather information about a firm or institution, or firms or institutions report
information they themselves gathered. Other individuals are compiling the data before they
are used. All the way their are many possible sources able to influence data analysis in the end.
Therefore in any case it is important to know how data are collected - and how the process
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of collection influences the data - in order to do reliable data analysis. The main objective of
this paper is to provide guidance on working with survey data.
3.2 How survey production can drive the results of
survey analysis
Survey data as a source for descriptive statistics and increasingly microeconometric analyses
is heavily used in economics. However, in most cases, the collection and compilation of survey
data is mostly done by statisticians while the analyses (especially microeconometrics) is con-
ducted (in the field of economics) by economists (microeconometricians) who are not involved
(in most cases) and not even familiar (in many cases) with the process of gathering the data.
This division between data compilers and data analysts is important, because the process
of gathering the data can heavily influence statistical inference. In order to provide valid re-
sults, a microeconometrician needs to be aware of and take into account the process of data
collection. In this section of the paper, we provide a non-technical overview of several steps in
the data collection and generation processes which can influence statistical inference. For the
sake of simplicity, we concentrate on household survey data, but most of the arguments hold
for all various types of survey data (e.g. data on firm level, personal consumer surveys, etc.)
The main problem of statistical analysis with regard to some population at hand is a sim-
ple one. We want to be able to make true statements about the population, but in order to
do so, we would need information on all the elements of the population. Most of the times
this is not feasible because it would be too demanding - in terms of time and costs - to gather
all the necessary information we need from every member of the population. The solution to
this problem - at least to a certain degree - is to survey the population in a representative
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way. That means that we collect the necessary information for a subset of the population, the
so-called sample, which consists only of a very small fraction of the population. If we do that
according to some rules, it can be shown that we will be able to make true statements about
the whole population which are only based on information on the subset of the population
(sample). Because we do not have all the information on all of the elements of the population,
this statement comes with some degree of uncertainty, which is a known degree of uncertainty,
so long as everything is done correctly.
In order to make correct statements about the population on the basis of the sample and
to calculate the correct degree of uncertainty of these statements, two necessary conditions
have to be fulfilled. The first is proper collection of the data, which should include good doc-
umentation of all its steps. The second is the use of a number of adjustments and use of the
correct statistical methods to account for a given process of data gathering. In this section,
we review critical components of these two steps - the sample frame, sampling design, survey
mode, interviewing, paradata, weights, and imputation - to discuss how survey data ought to
be collected and compiled.
3.2.1 Sampling frame and sampling design
The sampling frame is a set of elements which optimally represents all of the elements in the
population which a researcher wants to make statements about. The sampling design includes
all the rules regarding how these elements are drawn into the sample.
Both the sampling frame and the sampling design are important and can have serious
impacts on the results a researcher finds when analysing the sample. In general one has to
distinguish between two different cases (most of the time only the second is relevant):
1. The researcher is only interested in making statements about the sample at hand, i.e.
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statements about the subset of elements actually surveyed (e.g. household taking part
in a certain survey).
2. The researcher is interested in making statements about the whole population by analysing
only the sample, i.e. the subset of elements actually surveyed.
Most of the time, researchers are interested in making statements about the whole popula-
tion and not only the sample. In this case, the sampling frame and sampling design is relevant
in order to be able to make true statements with a known uncertainty. This will typically be
a statement like:
“The average household income of the household population is y and if we would repeat
this survey using the same sampling frame and design indefinitely, 95% of the resulting ys
would lie in between x and z.”
The more elements the sample includes, i.e. the more elements are drawn from the target
population into the sample, the narrower this 95% confidence interval will be. In other words,
a larger sample leads to a more precise estimate of y. How to calculate this uncertainty is
another question and there are different possibilities, which have all their pros and cons. But
what is more important for us is that the estimate as well as its precision is not only influenced
by the different methods of calculation but possibly (and typically to a larger extent) also by
the sampling frame and sampling design.
Sample frame In the case of household surveys, which refer to the population of house-
holds in a certain geographical area (usually a country), many different types of sampling
frames are used. Some are based on lists of households (or individuals), some are based on
certain areas and some are based on other entities like buildings, telephone numbers or mailing
codes.
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An optimal frame includes units which represent all elements of the population without
double counts, i.e. all elements are included exactly once in the sampling frame. In most cases,
an optimal sampling frame is not feasible but there will be some over and/or under coverage
of certain parts of the population. In order to minimize possible bias of the sample, the first
goal is to minimize under- and/or overcoverage.
A typical example of a problem with coverage would be a household survey which uses a
list of telephone numbers as sampling frame. In this case, larger households (those with more
household members) which typically have more telephone numbers would be overrepresented,
because the probability of one of them being drawn into the sample is higher than for smaller
households. On the other hand, households without any telephone numbers (or whose tele-
phone numbers are not included in the list) are excluded. These households do not enter the
sample because they are not covered by the sampling frame. An attempt to minimize coverage
problems of this type would be to try to identify numbers which refer to the same dwelling (e.g.
using addresses linked to the telephone numbers if available) and cluster them in the process of
drawing households out of the list of telephone numbers to reduce the problem of overcoverage.
Even in relatively good sampling frames, sampling households from official dwelling lists
(e.g. Austrian Melderegister or lists of private dwellings from a post office) still lead to over-
as well as undercoverage problems. For that reason typically “institutionalized households”
- such as people living in prisons, homes for the elderly, or members of church and military
institutions - are excluded. The homeless and the super-rich are also hard to reach in typical
household surveys, giving rise to the so-called middle-class bias of such surveys. The US Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF) e.g. excludes - due to confidentiality reasons - the Forbes-Top-
400 high wealth individuals from the sample. The EU-SILC in Austria, for example, restricts
its sample frame to households who live at a dwelling with official “Hauptwohnsitz”-Status
(registered main-residence) in the Austrian “Melderegister”, which e.g. excludes many stu-
dents living and working in Vienna, but who have their official “Hauptwohnsitz” still at their
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parents’ main residence. It also excludes any people who do not want to register a “Haupt-
wohnsitz” but prefer to live in their “Nebenwohnsitz” for most of the year. This illustrates how
important it is how a household is defined, and to control which target population is covered
by the sample. Therefore, the definition of the elements which are a part of the sampling
frame is very important to understand what type of population the researcher can or cannot
make statements about in the end.
Of course sample-frame issues become especially important in cases as access-panels sam-
ples or experiments, when the sample is selected in a non-probabilistic way. In that case it is
very difficult to give estimates and corresponding standard errors a meaningful interpretation
with relation to a certain target population. This leads us to the sampling design which defines
how the sample is drawn from a given sample frame.
Sampling design The sampling design includes all the rules regarding how elements in
the sample frame are selected into the sample. Given an optimal sample frame (all elements
of the population are included exactly once), the most efficient way to draw elements into the
sample would be a simple random sampling scheme where all elements are selected with equal
probability of 1 divided by the number of elements. Again, the more elements drawn into
the sample, the more precise the resulting estimates (statements) would be. Note that given
some ex-ante knowledge of the target population there might be good reasons to oversample
certain parts of the target population. As examples it makes sense to oversample (i) parts of
the population which are known to have higher non-response rates than others or (ii) parts of
the population which hold a disproportional part of a certain item one wants to measure, i.e.
parts of the population which contribute more to the overall variance of a certain item than
other parts.
In practice, there are many other constraints that hinder the sample design from being
completely simple random sampling, and instead consist of a sampling process using a number
76
of stages. In a staged sampling process, elements are grouped into sets and those sets can be
grouped again (this can go on many times) and then elements are taken from the subgroups.
A typical example would be a household survey, in which in the first stage municipalities are
drawn, then in the second stage streets or blocks are drawn, and in a third stage households are
drawn. Of course such a type of sampling reduces costs but (in general) it increases variance,
because of the clustered nature of the resulting sample and the fact that elements grouped
(e.g. regionally) in a certain set are probably more homogenous than elements in general. For
an overview of different sampling possibilities see Kish (1995).
Why should the analyst care about the sample frame and sampling design?
First, the sample frame implies to which target population statements resulting from survey
analysis refer to. For example, typically sample frames for household surveys exclude “institu-
tionalized households”. Therefore statements resulting from survey analysis using those data
are not including those households. Or in the case of EU-SILC in Austria, which only samples
households which are living in a dwelling where a “Hauptwohnsitz” is registered, all resulting
estimates are not refering to all other households living in dwellings where no “Hauptwohnsitz”
is registered.
Again, data gathered in experimental studies are a rather extreme case very well illustrat-
ing the problem. An experiment conducted with voluntary participants at a certain university
is not representing the overall population and very likely even not the student population or
the student population at the university where the experiment took place. If a well defined
sample frame as well as a well defined sampling design those not exist it is impossible to relate
resulting estimates to a certain target population. Instead statements can only be drawn with
regard to the sample at hand and standard errors of estimates have no clear interpretation
with regard to a certain target population as long as the selection process is not controlled via
the sample frame and sampling design.
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Therefore it is of utmost importance to know details about the sampling frame and design
used to be able to relate the resulting estimates to a well defined target population and to
give the corresponding standard errors a meaningful interpretation.
Secondly, the sampling design is important in terms of weighting. Even if there is proper
knowledge and documentation of the sample frame and sampling design this information needs
to be taken into account correctly when analysing the data. Without controlling for the sample
design, most estimates will be biased (see 3.2.5 for details). Design weights, which should give
the inverse probability of a certain element being drawn in the sample, are usually calculated
but seldom provided in research datasets. With design weights, one can correct for possible
unequal selection probabilities. Unequal selection probabilities may be introduced for several
reasons, the most important of which are cost reduction and/or oversampling of a certain
group in order to obtain higher precision of that particular group. What is mostly included
in research datasets are so called final weights, which should - at least in theory - also include
design weights.
There is hardly any dispute in the literature concerning the use of survey weights when
estimating population means or elasticities, and recent literature argues clearly in favour of
using weights in regression analysis as well (i.e. doing WLS (Weighted Least Squares) instead
of OLS (Ordinary Least Squares)), as soon as the sample is non-random and weights are given
as the inverse sampling probability (Angrist and Pischke 2009; Faiella 2010).
3.2.2 Survey mode
The survey mode is the method of gathering data in a survey environment. There are different
methods available and different methods are suited for different situations and goals. The main
question is what quality of the gathered data is necessary in order to be able to conduct certain
analyses. When the population of interest consists of private households (but also persons,
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firms, etc.) there are several possibilities at hand. Depending on the complexity and amount
of the data which should be gathered, some survey modes are more appropriate than others. In
general there is a strong trade off between quality and cost. These days, mostly the following
survey modes are used:
• Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI).
• Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI).
• (Audio) Computer Assisted Self-Interviewing ((A)CASI).
• Paper And Pencil Interviewing (PAPI).
For a long time, the most common survey method was PAPI. In PAPI methods, a paper-
based questionnaire is sent to the household, and a certain member of the household is sup-
posed to answer the questions and send the survey back. Problems with this type of data
gathering are obvious, as many complex surveys are difficult for respondents to understand,
and the program of the questionnaire should differ for different households. For example in
a survey on housing, an owner-occupier household should answer questions concerning the
primary residence the household owns whereas different questions are relevant for households
who are tenants in their primary residence.
(A)CASI interviews are mostly web-based and have certain advantages compared to PAPI
surveying, as one can program a path dependent questionnaire and can provide some help to
the respondents when necessary. As there is no personal interaction taking place between an
interviewer and a respondent, both (A)CASI and PAPI are not exposed to interviewer bias,
which we will discuss later. On the other hand, a main problem is that non-response is in
general much higher in self-administered surveys and problems of understanding the question-
naire can be very severe especially in complex surveys.
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CATI as well as CAPI involve an interviewer asking the respondent the questions and
guiding him/her through the questionnaire. The main advantage is that the interviewer, if
trained properly, can be of enormous help to explain unclear questions and decreasing unit-
as well as item-non response.
Especially for complex and demanding surveys, CAPI is considered to be the best choice.
The interviewer is in personal contact with the respondent and can explain questions to
him/her. Furthermore, supplemental material, such as paper based cards, can be used which
help the interviewee to answer questions, especially if there is the need to choose from a large
number of categories. Moreover, direct plausibility checks can be programmed and immedi-
ately executed and worked on during the interviews, leading to more consistent interviews and
preventing misunderstandings. For these reasons, most complex scientific surveys today use
the CAPI method (see Groves et al. 2004).
In EU-SILC some countries use only CAPI (e.g. Italy), some only self-administered PAPI
(e.g. Germany), some only interviewer-based PAPI (e.g. Hungary) and some only CATI (e.g.
Iceland) - but many of them use a mixture of the aforementioned possibilities. The literature is
pretty clear about the fact that those methods have all a certain impact on the data gathered
with the method at hand (see Groves et al. 2004; De Leeuw 2008)
Hauser (2007) clearly states the problems arising for the German EU-SILC dataset which
is collected using only self-administered PAPI. That this leads to different results than a fully-
fledged CAPI-Approach is obvious. Hauser mentions several points questioning the quality of
the dataset and therefore especially its comparability to datasets collected in a different way.
We mention just a selection of the many arguments here:
• Self administered interviews lead to higher non-response rate
• Sending interviews by post leads to severe problems when trying to resolve inconsisten-
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cies ex-post via telephone; those households who can not be reached because they have
no landlines are significantly different from the ones with landlines
• Self-administered complex surveys lead to many misunderstandings and wrong answers
due to the misunderstanding. Those misunderstandings are non-random but correlated
with education, income and many other variables in the survey
• Sample material is sent out in German, but there is no way to control for non-response
due to language problems, because it is not known why a household did not answer:
there could be no household at a certain address, the household might have denied
participation, the household could have problems understanding the material, etc.
While many surveys use mixed mode strategies in the contact phase, the use of mixed
modes in the response phase is less frequent. Nevertheless mode changes during a response
phase are increasingly used especially when dealing with sensitive questions. In those cases
the mode change occurs for all the respondents for certain questions. Mode changes in the
response phase in the sense that for a part of the respondents a certain mode is used while for
others a different mode are less common.
While in the first type of mode change in the response phase still all respondents answer
all questions given the same mode as all the other respondents in the second type different
respondents answer the same questions given different modes. The Literature calls this situa-
tion a mixed-mode design1 and it is e.g. used in the Austrian EU-SILC survey (see De Leeuw
2008). In this case the question arises if the mode has an impact on response behaviour given
a certain question.
Since the 2008 wave, EU-SILC in Austria uses CATI as well as CAPI as interviewer modes.
Households which can not be reached via CATI or opt for CAPI instead of CATI are turned
1Those can be split up into concurrent and sequential mixed mode designs. The main difference is
that in the sequential design only for those who are not reachable with the first mode another mode
is tried in a follow up phase, whereas in the concurrent mixed mode designs people can (also) opt for
a certain mode
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into CAPI cases. The selection bias of this method is obvious: for households which are easily
reachable via telephone and are willing to provide information via telephone the information
is gathered via CATI, whereas the information on the rest of the households, if they can be
reached personally, is collected via CAPI. As there is no identifier included in the user (re-
searcher) dataset (at least thus far for EU-SILC 2008) an analyst - even if s/he would like to -
can not control for the influence of the survey mode. And more worrisome: even if s/he could,
nobody knows which part of the difference is due to the mentioned selection bias and which is
due to the survey mode, because the survey mode is not distributed randomly to households
in the sample.
To illustrate the impact of the use of different interview modes we look at the Autrian EU-
SILC wave 2008. Table 3.1 shows the differences in the income distribution between CAPI
and CATI observations in the EU-SILC wave 2008. Note that we control for selection bias
via coarsened exact matching on variables from the 2007 EU-SILC wave where all households
where still interviewed with the same interview mode (CAPI). Fessler, Kasy and Lindner (2011)
use a non-parametric 1 to n coarsened matching procedure based on all significant variables in
a selection equation to balance the observations on a large set of covariates including income
in 20072. Whereas the gini coefficient is 0.30 (0.31 in the unbalanced sample) in the CATI
sample, it is 0.32 (0.34 in the unbalanced sample) in the CAPI sample. Furthermore they
show that the use of CAPI significantly reduces item non-response for income questions as
well as leads to higher values of income especially at the top of the income distribution.
All those facts have an impact on the resulting joint distributions of the variables. This
is true for all different survey modes. Some things are more problematic to talk about on the
phone than in person, some things can be difficult in a self administered survey, which could
be explained by an interviewer on the phone and would be no problem at all in a personal
interview.
22199 out of 3772 Households on common support (430 out of 1652 covariate combinations)
82
Table 3.1: Differences in Gini Coefficients over modes with bootstrapped standard
errors
Bootstraped Differences Bootstraped Differences: Balanced Observations
CAPI-CATI 0.029** 0.018*
(0.013) (0.009)
Notes: This table shows the estimates for the difference in Gini Coefficients for the unbalanced and
balanced datasets.
Moreover in some cases so called “output oriented” datasets are using different methods
of data gathering when compiling a dataset. EU-SILC is a output oriented project meaning
that there are a large amount of output variables defined and every participating country
gathers the data to compile their EU-SILC dataset. Then EUROSTAT merges the dataset and
researchers use the dataset as if it were one single dataset. The data gathering techniques are
not harmonized over the different countries participating in EU-SILC, and this ends up being
quite problematic. Lohmann (2011) illustrated the resulting problems for EU-SILC data using
the relationship between employment, earnings and poverty as an example. He differentiates
between four basic approaches to data collection varying across EU-SILC countries:
• Survey: income and employment information from the same source (personal interview)
• Survey/proxy: income and employment information from the same source (personal
proxy interview, i.e. a person from a certain household gives the information about
another person of the same household)
• Register: income and employment information from two different sources (register data
and personal interview)
• Register/proxy: income and employment information from two different sources (register
data and proxy interview)
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The data gathering process is different in all different settings in the sense that it combines
(or not) register data with personal interviews and proxy interviews when gathering certain
information about individuals living in private households. Lohmann (2011) finds that there
is a significant effect of the different types of data gathering on poverty rates by activity status
and on the poverty risk of non-working and working population.
Why should the analyst care about the survey mode? In a perfect world, the
survey mode would have no effect on the respondents’ answers and and the impact on unit-
and item non-response could be perfectly corrected with statistical methods, and an analyst
would therefore have no need to care about the survey mode. But in general, the situation
an analyst is confronted with in the real world is different. The European Union Statistics on
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) is one of the best examples to illustrate the severity
of problems arising from the use of different data gathering techinques and different survey
modes.
In sum, if an analyst is interested in the question of being able to make true statements
with a known uncertainty about a population at hand, s/he must first be interested in how
the data was gathered. It is important that any differences in how samples were drawn and
differences in the survey mode be noted in the data and available to the researcher. In the
case of country comparisons and different methods of data gathering, the minimum one can
do is to use country fixed effects, but which neither helps to identify the impacts of the dif-
ferent types of data gathering techniques - including different survey- and interviewing modes
- over countries nor eliminates the problem of biased joint distributions due to different data
gathering techniques - including different survey- and interviewing modes - inside one country
dataset.
If identifiers for different survey modes, proxy interviewers or other differences are available
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they should be controlled for in all types of regression analysis. If one has reason to believe
that the impact of a certain data gathering technique might be different for different groups
of households additionally interaction terms should be used to allow for heterogenous effects
over the covariates used. Ignoring differences in data gathering might likely lead to severe bias.
3.2.3 Interviewing
Interviewers and interviewing itself is by far the most underestimated ingredient when it comes
to data collection. Interviewer-bias, the influence interviewers have on the respondents an-
swers, is well covered in the relevant literature (e.g. Groves et al. 2004). The use of a large
number of interviewers is a way to reduce interviewer bias in the overall dataset. Nevertheless
the influence of certain interviewer characteristics on certain responses hardly receives any
attention in empirical analysis. The main reason is pretty straight forward because there are
basically no research datasets available which cover information on the interviewers. Never-
theless, such information could influence the datasets and therefore research through different
channels. The most important are for sure unit- and item non-response which are covered
in sections 3.2.5 and 3.2.6. But also the content - values and outcomes - of the information
gathered in an interview can be influenced by certain interviewer characteristics. There could
be more trust with some types of interviewers and respondents than between others, some in-
terviewers might probe in a less or more manipulative way than others, and some interviewers
even induce certain behaviour just by their appearance or by making statements that induce
ideas about the values of the interviewer to the respondent. All of these possibilities can lead
to bias.
Why should the analyst care about interviewing? If there is information about
the interviewers available in the research dataset, the analyst can try to control for certain char-
acteristics when analysing the data. This should help to reduce interviewer-bias. Of course,
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one has to be aware of the possible high correlation of interviewers with regional variables.
As such information is almost never available, the analyst should at least gather information
on how the data producers tried to reduce this type of bias. This should typically include
detailed interviewer training, documentation about the number of interviewers and guidelines
for their work, including material which was provided for a successful interviewing situation
(handbooks, glossaries, etc.). The analyst should also check if the data producers gathered
information about interviewers to use that in the process of weighting for non-response and
dealing with item-non response in the imputation process.
3.2.4 Paradata
Paradata are all data, which are not part of the interview itself and therefore not provided via
answers of respondents. Typically that might be information about the dwelling of a house-
hold like the surrounding area, the type building, the availability of a car-port or facts about
the interview itself, like if a respondent used certain documents when answering questions or
how many people where arround. The larger the amount of paradata available which does not
depend on the participation in the survey the better for controlling for unit non-response issues.
As we mentioned in section 3.2.1 it is of utmost importance to know which target popu-
lation is represented in the sample and which parts might be under- or overrepresented. We
will go into deeper detail concerning that issues in section 3.2.5. For now it is important to
mention, that unfortunately most survey datasets only consist of that part of the sample which
in the end participated in a certain survey. All observations which are not eligible or did not
participate in the survey are usually not included in research datasets. Furthermore in many
surveys no data at all is gathered about sampled households which did finally not participate
in the survey, either because they did not want or could not be reached. Therefore typically
only few information is available to model the process of unit non-response and calculate cor-
rect non-response weights (see 3.2.5).
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Why should the analyst care about Paradata If the analysts goal is to make
statements about the sampled target population s/he needs to care about the process of non-
response. This is crucial because non-response is very unlikely randomly distributed in the
sample and therefore the observations available to the analyst might misrepresent the original
target population represented in the sample. For that reason unit non-response weights should
be calculated (see section 3.2.5).
If the researcher dataset includes the whole sample (including non-respondents) and also in-
cludes paradata information an analyst can model the process of unit non-response. In most
cases though, this crucial information is not included in research datasets and very often para-
data - if gathered at all - is not gathered for all households, including the non-respondents.
As most survey dataset are available only including so called final-weights, the only thing a
thoughtfull analyst can do is to check the documentation if non-response weights (adjustments)
are included in the final weights. Furthermore it is important to know the actual non-response
rate and how much paradata was available to produce non-response weights (adjustments) to
get an idea about the degree to which the original target population is represented by the
resulting dataset. Quality - with regard to the problem at hand - rises with decreasing non-
response rate and with the amount of paradata available for all sampled elements, which was
used in the non-response adjustment.
Of course the worst case scenario is one where no information at all can be provided about
non-response. This happens when a survey had no fixed apriori sample, which means that data
is gathered as long as it takes until a certain number of participating households is reached. In
that case there is no possibility to tackle the problem of unit non-response in a sensible way.
3.2.5 Weights
Weights are part of most survey datasets. Many analysts have the idea that they are only
reweighting the observations to fit certain population-characteristics (as e.g. the distributions
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of age, gender, region or household size) and as one controls for those variables in a regression,
they think they can forget about weights. If a survey is carried out poorly, that might be true.
But for most scientific surveys today, that idea is wrong and can likely lead to serious bias
in estimates. In state of the art scientific surveys a set of weights is produced in order (i) to
correct for certain misrepresentations of the sample and (ii) to allow the correct estimation of
variances even without sampling variables (like PSUs, SSUs, STRATA, etc.), which are - due
to confidentiality issues - mostly not available in research datasets.
Misrepresentation, in the sense that the sample characteristics are not to an argueably
degree representing the target population characteristics, arises due to different phenomena,
of which the most important are:
• Sampling Design
• Erroneous inclusions
• Erroneous exclusions
• Non-Response
The sampling design leads to misrepresentation as soon as the probability of being drawn
into the sample is not the same for all elements in the sample frame. That is very often the
case in complex survey designs and is sometimes a goal in order to increase the precision of
estimates for certain groups and/or items (oversampling). Nevertheless as long as the proba-
bility to be drawn into the sample is positive and known for every element in the sample frame
the inverse probability is the correct design weight and is therefore already given apriori to
correct for the resulting misrepresentation due to the sampling design.
Examples for errorneous inclusions are e.g. multiple (unknown) inclusions of households in the
sample frame and for errorneous exclusion e.g. if more than one household is located in one
dwelling or households are sampled via telephone adresses and households without telephones
exist. Non-Response leads to misrepresentation as soon as it is not completely random.
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Basically every dataset suffers from one or (mostly) more of the problems mentioned. If an
analysis of the data at hand is restricted to making statements only about the subset (in
the case of erroneous inclusion not a subset but including also elements not included in the
target population) of the population covered in the dataset, those problems can be ignored
and an analysis without reweighting, i.e. assuming equal weights for every observation is in
order. If the goal is to make statements about the target population correct weights have to
be considered in most cases.
Typically the final weights included in most surveys (should) consist of the following
weights correcting for different misrepresentations:
• Design weights (correcting for unequal sampling probabilities)
• Coverage weights (correcting for under- or overcoverage in the frame)
• Non-response weights (correcting for the non-random part of the non-response process)
• Post-stratification weights (fitting the sample closer to distributions in the population;
external data needed)
In most surveys, a so called final weight is provided (which includes in the optimal case
all the above mentioned weighting steps). Given that weight as well as sampling information
(Primary Sampling Units (PSU), Secondary Sampling Units (SSU), STRATA, etc.) one can
calculate unbiased (in the sense of design unbiased not model unbiased as described by Faiella
2010) estimates as well as the correct variances, taking into account the sampling process.
Many statistical software packages provide special packages to estimate the correct variances
using the sampling information and linearization (however some commonly estimated param-
eters do not allow for standard error estimation via linearization - e.g. the median). But
for many surveys, sampling information is - due to confidentiality issues - not provided in
the research datasets. In order to be able to calculate the correct variances of the estimates,
so-called replicate weights are included in at least some state of the art datasets. These are
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calculated by the data producers and are based on numerical methods (mostly bootstrap and
jacknife procedures) using the sampling information. Properly used, they allow for a correct
variance estimation even in the absence of sampling information as STRATA, PSUs or SSUs.
When constructing the weights, data producers face a bias versus variance trade off. Their
decisions can heavily influence later results. A typical example is the trimming of weights:
Let us assume that for weighting reasons households where grouped with regard to some
socioeconomic characteristics as well as sampling information and paradata available. As a
next step these groups would be ordered -maybe by socioeconomic characteristics as well as
paradata - according to their non-response rate. Let us assume that the group with the highest
non-response rate has a significantly higher non-response rate than all the other groups in the
sample, implying very high weights for this subgroup relative to other parts of the sample. A
common practice if the weights (and therefore overall variance) would get “too high”3 is to
merge the subgroup with the next closest subgroup and weight them together. Let us assume
that the group with the highest non-response had a non-response rate of 80% - implying
non-response weights of 5 - and the group with the second highest non-response rate had a
non-response rate of 60% - implying non-response weights of 2.5. Merged together - assuming
the second grouped included more individuals - the non response rate of the resulting group
is 66% - implying non-response weights of 3. This pooling of different households of course
implies a certain misrepresentation because two different groups for which non-response was
different are know treated as one - more heterogenous - group of households for which equal
non-response weighting is applied. This of course results in less variance but higher bias
implying a higher probability of statistical significant results when doing survey analysis (see
3.2.6 for a similar problem). In practice one has the choice to introduce as many groups
as reasonably possible - given the amount of information available for the whole sample -
minimizing the bias resulting from non-response but maximizing the variance introduced by
this step. Or, calculating one single non-response rate and use that one for weighting to control
3The rules applied in that context, i.e. what is considered as “too high”, seem to be rather arbitrary.
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for non-response, which of course means nothing else than not weighting for non-response at
all, i.e. ignoring the non-response process - maximizing the bias resulting from non-response
but minimizing the variance introduced by this step.
Why should the analyst care about survey weights? Most of the time researchers
want to make statements about a certain population of interest, called the target population.
If so, either reweighting or strong assumptions concerning most methods applied are in or-
der. There is hardly any dispute in the literature concerning the use of survey weights when
estimating population means or elasticities and recent literature argues clearly in favour of
using weights also in regression analysis, i.e. doing WLS (Weighted Least Squares) instead
of OLS (Ordinary Least Squares). The advocates of WLS claim that WLS parameters are
more robust because they are model unbiased if the model is true and design consistent if it
is not. If the OLS model is misspecified and predictors correlated to the response variable are
omitted, OLS estimates may be biased and inconsistent (Faiella 2010).
Nevertheless under certain (pretty strong) assumptions4, the WLS estimate will be con-
sistent for β for any vector of weights, including the OLS case of a vector of equal weights.
Furthermore, if the error εi is homoskedastic the case of equal weights (OLS) is the most
efficient one. Note that for the necessary assumption E(εi∣xi) = 0 to be reasonable, the deter-
minants of the sampling frame and non-response process need to be included in the controls
(Cameron 2010).
An easy check is to do both OLS and WLS. If the estimates are significantly different from
each other, that would indicate that E(εi∣xi) ≠ 0, and WLS is in order. The risk of doing
OLS when indeed WLS would be in order is getting biased significant estimates due to model
misspecification. The risk of using WLS if OLS is in order - in the sense that all necessary
conditions are fulfilled - is that a unbiased estimate could be not significant even though it
4Namely that the DGP (Data Generating Process) is in fact the specified model yi = x′iβ + εi and
sufficient controls are assumed to be added so that the error E(εi∣xi) = 0
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would be significant in a more efficient OLS specification with weights being equal.
Basically the problem is analogous to the question of using a random effects model instead
of a fixed effects model: the random effects model is a parametrical restriction of the fixed
effects model. In the same sense, the OLS model is a parametrical restriction of the WLS
model, namely with the restriction of weights being equal for all units. In that spirit some ar-
gue in favor of using a kind of Hausman test. Under the null hypothesis, the estimates of OLS
and WLS are not different and both WLS and OLS are consistent. In that case OLS, using
equal weights, is more efficient and WLS would pointlessly increase the parameters standard
errors (as the fixed effects model when indeed the random effects model is in order). Under
the alternative hypothesis only the WLS estimator is consistent whereas OLS estimates are
inconsistent.
Theoretically, a broader range of possible tests in order to identify if design and non-
response is ignorable or not, i.e. if OLS is consistent or one should work instead with WLS, is
available. The problem in most cases is, that due to confidentiality and other constraints most
researchers are not able to perform those tests. In many cases only final weights are delivered,
but not design, non-response, post-stratification weights separately. Very often information
on strata and other necessary sampling information is not included in the datasets available
to researchers. To sum up, to be on the safe (always consistent) side, WLS is in order. If one
is dealing with efficiency problems and therefore wants to use OLS, both resulting estimates
should at least be compared. If they are significantly different, the OLS estimator is biased.
All of this applies to all other models assuming equal weights.
Whereas for means etc. the effects are obvious table 3.2 shows the impact of the use of
weights versus not using weights in an example of regression analysis. While the signs of
the estimates are not changed by the use of survey weights (which is of course theoretically
possible), coefficients and standard errors differ even if no imputation but listwise deletion
is used (as in columns OLS1 and OLS2 of table 3.2. In the case of using simple imputation
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and therefore controlling for item non-response the impact of using weights is already very
pronounced (see columns OLS3 and OLS5 of table 3.2), i.e. 3 out of 7 coefficients turn out
to be not statistically different from zero on a 5% significance level as soon as weights are
used. For the estimation using multiple imputations given in column OLS6 (which can not be
reasonably done without weights), which is the only one which provides the correct standard
errors including the uncertainty introduced by imputations the effect is even stronger (see
section 3.2.6 for more details).
Table 3.2: Household Survey on Housing Wealth 2008; OLS Regressions of household
real estate wealth on household characteristics illustrating the use of using weights
and/or single/multiple imputations,
OLS1 OLS2 OLS3 OLS4 OLS5 OLS6
Vienna -0.358*** -0.308*** -0.359 -0.275*** -0.334 -0.269
(0.122) (0.106) (0.251) (0.087) (0.296) (0.318)
Inheritance 0.768*** 0.672*** 1.944*** 0.543*** 2.092*** 1.964***
(0.154) (0.173) (0.253) (0.133) (0.426) (0.440)
No. of adults 0.427*** 0.410*** 0.410*** 0.327*** 0.396*** 0.467***
(0.062) (0.084) (0.125) (0.066) (0.099) (0.112)
Age 0.085*** 0.081*** 0.099*** 0.072*** 0.065 0.067
(0.017) (0.013) (0.035) (0.011) (0.045) (0.047)
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female 0.107 0.095 0.204 0.090 0.168 0.183
(0.097) (0.096) (0.200) (0.079) (0.194) (0.196)
Medium education 0.500*** 0.500*** 0.660** 0.413*** 0.574** 0.528**
(0.140) (0.117) (0.288) (0.096) (0.228) (0.254)
High education 0.619*** 0.616*** 0.684** 0.520*** 0.641** 0.589*
(0.160) (0.151) (0.331) (0.126) (0.281) (0.333)
Constant -2.692*** -2.561*** -2.780*** -2.093*** -1.949* -2.088*
(0.411) (0.326) (0.865) (0.269) (1.072) (1.137)
Survey Weights NO YES NO YES YES YES
Imputation Listwise Deletion Listwise Deletion Simple Simple Mean Simple Multiple
N 1686 1686 2081 2081 2081 2081
1686 1686 2081 2081 2081 2081
Notes:
(i) Standard Errors given in parentheses
(ii) *,**,*** denote significance on a 10, 5, and 1% significance level respectively
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3.2.6 Imputation
If the researcher is interested in making statements about the population at hand instead of
the sample population, s/he needs to deal with the problem of item non-response. As with
the problem of unit non-response, the problem of item non-response would not lead to biased
estimates if it were a random process. Most of the time one can not assume that item non-
response is a random process. There are many reasons why the process might very likely be
non-random: Older people may not be able to answer questions relating to past events, more
wealthy people tend to be unwilling to answer all questions related to their wealth, and/or the
trust between certain interviewers and respondents might be lower than between others.
In order to control for the item non-response process (see Rubin and Little 1986 for de-
tails) in order to obtain unbiased estimates we will distinguish the four most common choices
researchers make:
1. Ignore the item non-response process, also known as listwise deletion
2. Include the item non-response process in the model
3. Impute missing values first and use the imputed data
4. Use data already imputed by the data producers
While for a long time solution 1 was chosen by most researchers, solution 4 seems to be
the most common one today. Nevertheless the quality of imputations and the methods used
differ quite strongly over different surveys.
Solution 1 In general it is a bad idea to simply ignore item non-response. In most
models, many variables are used and almost always the missing pattern in those variables is
different for different observations. Nevertheless if only one variable is missing for a certain ob-
servation, the observation is excluded from the analysis. In most statistical software packages
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(like STATA, PASW or R) this is the default procedure, and it implies that a huge amount of
available information is discarded. Assume that you have a sample with 100 observations and
10 variables, ten missing patterns which are mutually exclusive and ten groups of households
with a certain missing pattern for which always 1 variable is missing. That implies that out
of the 1000 data points, 900 (90%) are non-missing - but at the same time, if you specify a
model including all ten variables, you can not estimate anything because the number of usable
observations is zero. Even if one is left with a reasonable number of observations, the estimates
will be biased as soon as the item non-response process is non-random.
Solutions 2 and 3 To include the item non-response process in the model is (in
theory) maybe the best approach because one has full control on how the item non-response
process is modelled, and depending on the particular research question, the optimal solution
to modelling this process might vary. The analyst can impute her/himself which is essentially
the same, especially if a new imputation model is designed in order to fit a certain research
question at hand. In both cases one can take care that all the relevant variables used later
in the analysis are included in the imputation process and is therefore not dependent on the
choice of the data producers which might not fit the research project at hand. But there are
two straight forward problems researchers typically face when pursuing that approach: First,
the available methods (such as the Heckman Selection Models) are grounded on strong as-
sumptions, and second (and more severe), most research datasets do not include information
which might be very relevant for the item non-response process. This information consists of
information on the sampling, the interviewers, certain questions especially designed for the
use in imputations as e.g. an estimate of monthly total net household income provided by the
respondent, while all income sources are in general covered separately. Not being able to use
this information - which might be available to the data producers and indeed used by them
when imputing the missing values - might lead to a misguided and misspecified modelling of
the item non-response process.
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Solution 4 The main advantage of using already imputed data provided by the data pro-
ducers is that they know the data much better than any analyst could and more importantly
they are often able to use much more information which might be important for the item
non-response process but is not available in the research dataset (information on sampling,
interviewers, paradata, etc.). But the main problem is that they can not anticipate all possi-
ble research projects and therefore the imputation strategy used will fit well for some but not
for all research purposes. There are very few surveys using state of the art chained equation
multiple imputation approaches which ensure that (i) the joint distribution is taken into ac-
count properly, i.e. misspecified imputation does not destroy observed relationships between
variables and (ii) that the uncertainty which comes with imputation can be taken into account
properly when analysing the data, i.e. multiple imputations (instead of one) for every missing
value reflect the uncertainty about the estimated (but not observed) value. The US Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF), the spanish Encuesta Financiera de las Familias (EFF) or the
Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) are some of the rare examples
of surveys providing multiple imputations based on chained equations.
Why should the analyst care about imputation? Ignoring missing values (listwise
deletion) leads to biased estimates as soon as the item non-response process is non-random.
Furthermore, it discards a huge amount of observed information. Either modelling the item
non-response process in the analysis or using imputed datasets therefore is preferable. The
question therefore boils down to whether or not the researcher has enough information to model
the item non-response process or impute on her/his own or should s/he rely on imputations
done by the data producers?
The answer to this question depends heavily on three things:
• The quality of the available imputations
• The difference between the available information to the data producers (statistical
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dataset) and to the researcher (research dataset)
• The research project at hand
Good imputations should take into account the joint distribution of the observed variables
and use a broad conditioning approach to ensure the stability of relationships before and af-
ter imputation. They should also reflect the uncertainty of the imputed values, i.e. multiple
instead of single imputations and should be produced in a consistent way, i.e. multiple im-
putation with chained equations instead of a mixture of different models to impute different
variables independent of each other.
Good imputations need to take into account information on the sampling design as well as
paradata. If such information is not available in the research dataset, it is hard to do better
than data producers who had access to this type of information. The same is true for includ-
ing the item non-response process in a model. Furthermore, the research project at hand is
important. Let us assume that we want to measure the effect of education on wages, but for
whatever stupid reason the data producers imputed wages using a simple regression model or
hot-deck to impute but without taking education and its determinants into account. Than the
relationship between education and wages can be severely damaged in the imputed dataset.
Therefore it is always a good idea to look how data was imputed before using it.
Table 3.2 illustrates the impact of the use of listwise deletion, i.e. assuming the item
non-response process to be random, and three different imputation-techniques, “simple mean”
imputation, i.e. imputing missing values with means of non-missing observations, “simple”
regression based equation (already using a chained equation model), and “multiple” imputa-
tion by chained equations provided by the survey producers (see Albacete 2012). Whereas
the regressions based listwise deletion as well as simple mean imputation (see column OLS2
and column OLS4) lead to eight highly significant coefficients of pretty similar size, only 5
of them remain significant if more sophisticated imputation techniques are used (see column
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OLS5 and OLS6). This shows that the standard errors of the former regressions - without
proper imputation - are severely underestimated. In the case of the Inheritance dummy even
the size of the coefficient changes significantly showing that the item-non response process was
definetly non-random and therefore can lead to severe bias if it is not properly controlled for.
Comparing the columns OLS5 and OLS6, which are both using up to date chained equation
imputations, reveals that if the uncertainty which comes with imputed values is not controlled
for, i.e. if simple instead of multiple imputation is used, the standard errors are still underes-
timated.
3.3 Final Remarks
In economics, researchers use many different types of data to test theoretical hypotheses or
to describe some empirical facts. The goal is usually to say something about a certain target
population. All of these data - if register data or survey data - is produced by humans and
the way that it is produced has certain implications for the results the researcher will get.
It is therefore of utmost importance to be aware and if necessary take into account the
data production process in the analysis. That includes the definition of the primary unit the
data refers to (e.g. household sector, households, individuals, etc.), the general way of data
gathering (e.g. register or survey data) and several other specific processes (e.g. interview
mode in the case of survey data). Furthermore, especially in micro-data issues of coverage,
unit- and item non-response play an important role. Therefore if possible one always needs to
deal with questions of weighting and imputation in order to get a correct picture of a certain
target-population. Very often one faces a trade off between bias and variance (e.g. trimming
weights in data production or using weights in data analyses).
In the last two decades survey providers are increasingly taking care of those complex issues.
While years ago only post-stratification weights and listwise deletion were common, today more
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complex weighting and imputation techniques are used by a rising number of data providers.
These tools allow for unbiased estimates (e.g. using proper multiple imputations or modelling
the non response process) and make correct variance estimation feasible (e.g. using sampling
information and linearization or replicate weights).
These methods make life a little more complicated for the researcher because using a multiple
imputed dataset and taking care of the complex sampling structure of a survey implies some
extra work. Even though most of the research-datasets available still do not allow to obtain
a correct variance estimation (as they (i) do not include sampling information or provide
replicate weights and (ii) use simple imputation methods which lead underestimated standard
errors) the possibility to do so is rising fairly quickly.
We have tried to show that researchers should spend time in looking into and understanding
the datasets they are working with, and to be aware of the possible impacts data production
has on the results they are obtaining, which might be much larger than e.g. the choice of
a slightly different econometric specification or model, an activity many researchers invest a
large amount of time.
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Chapter 4
A Note on the Effects of Higher
Education on Earnings
4.1 Introduction
Over the last several decades a vast literature has been produced documenting the positive
relationship between the education and earnings of individuals. Nevertheless, as social sciences
suffer from the fact that they have no equivalent to laboratory experiments, it is difficult to
make claims about a causal effect between the two. The fact that highly educated individuals
earn more than individuals with lower levels of education is not only a result of education
itself but the difference in earnings is at least partly due to selection bias. If more highly
educated individuals earn more than lower educated individuals due to a stronger skill set,
for example, the effect of education measured by the difference in observable earnings would
overstate a causal effect. Many confounding factors might lead to selection bias overstating
a causal effect. It has also been argued that ability bias might be small compared to other
possible biases and that the causal effect would be understated by between-group earnings
differences (Card (1999)).
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Different econometric techniques have been used to control for selection bias in order to
give estimates a causal interpretation. Most prominent in the literature on education and
earnings are instrumental variable approaches based on either institutional features of the
school system or family background, siblings and twin datasets as well as direct controls for
abilities or family background (see Ashenfelter et al. (1999) and Card (1999) for extensive
surveys of the literature.)
Card (1999) shows that family background (measured e.g. using parental education) is in
general not a good instrument in that case, as likely a direct causal relationship between the
instrument and the outcome exists and therefore the exclusion restriction (necessary for valid
IV-estimation) does not hold. However, one can use parental education as a control to at least
partly eliminate selection bias (Card 1999, page 1825).
One important issue when dealing with the causal effects of education on earnings and
therefore with selection bias is the fact that the effect itself needs to be regarded as a random
variable which might vary considerably with different socioeconomic and personal characteris-
tics of individuals. Models differ extensively in the way they allow effects to be heterogenous.
Blundell et al. (2005) provide an extensive review of the different workhorses in this strand of
literature, which are OLS, IV, Control Functions and Matching.
The first of the few papers on the returns to education in Austria was Christl (1984),
addressing differences in returns to education across occupations in a Mincerian framework.
Boss et al. (1997) compare returns to education among private and public sector workers and
Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer (1999) present estimates of the returns to education in Austria
from 1981 to 1997. In their follow-up work Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer (2003) show that
returns to education have been falling during this period.
In this paper we employ Austrian HSHW 2008 data in order to check if the returns to
education in Austria as typically estimated in the literature might be overestimated due to
the lack of control variables for social background. Our dataset includes parental education
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which allows us to at least partly control for selection bias due to the social background of the
individuals. None of the paper on returns to education for Austria covers such a control. In
section 4.2 we discuss our empirical strategy. Section 4.3 describes the data we use. In section
4.4 we show and discuss results and in section 4.5 we conclude.
4.2 Empirical Strategy
4.2.1 Potential Outcome Approach
Most estimates of the returns to education literature use some type of the Mincerian setting
yi = α + β1Si + β2Ei + β3E2i + εi (4.2.1)
where yi are (log) earnings, Si years of education and Ei years of working experience of
individual i. If working experience is not available for some reason most researchers use the
age of the individual minus Si minus 6 as a proxy for Ei. If, as in many datasets, only discrete
variables are available, dummies and interactions between them are used (see Card (1999)).
Sometimes industry or occupational dummies are also included in this type of earnings
regression. However if one is interested in the (causal) effect of education on earnings (returns
to education), that is a bad idea, as it adds additional bias. All variables which are themselves
potential outcomes of the educational attainment are not proper controls (Angrist and Pischke
(2009)).
Furthermore, most earnings regressions are plagued by two problems if one wants to give
the resulting estimates of the returns to education a causal interpretation. First, educational
attainment is not randomly distributed in the population and the most important controls
for that selection are missing. Second, most models are not flexible enough and therefore the
resulting estimates for the returns to education result from the strong linearity assumptions
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and extrapolation outside the common support, even in terms of the included controls.
As shown in many empirical papers as (see Hertz et al. (2007) for an international compar-
ison and Fessler et al. (2012) for results for Austria), parental education is highly correlated
with educational attainment of the descendants. Many studies interested in the causal effect
of education on earnings therefore use parental education to control for selection bias.
As selection bias in our empirical exercise results from the possibility that individuals with
university degree might have had higher earnings anyway, (because selection to university is
non-random) we use (i) parental education as control for selection bias and (ii) a flexible non-
parametric model which allows us to restrict our analysis to the common support of university
education with relation to our controls.
In this section we use a potential outcome approach as described in recent microecono-
metric literature on program evaluation and the measurement of causal effects in quasi-
experimental designs, which can be found in a number of recent books (e.g. Morgan and
Winship (2007), Angrist and Pischke (2009), Abbring and Heckman (2007)) and papers (e.g.
Angrist and Krueger (1998), Blundell and Dias (2002) and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009)).
As we can not assume random assignment of university degrees, we need to control for
selection into higher levels of education in order to to justify a causal interpretation of estimated
effects. Under the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA)1, treatment assignment is
ignorable and independent of the potential outcomes,
P{Ti∣Xi, Y0i, Y1i} = P (Ti∣Xi) (4.2.2)
and selection bias disappears. Under this assumption differences between the treatment
1also referred to as unconfoundedness assumption and given by {Y0i, Y1i} upmodels Ti∣Xi
106
and the control group have a causal interpretation, because educational attainment conditional
on selection variables Xi is random. The remaining question is how to select the vector of
covariates Xi. This set of controls needs to be chosen in a certain way to reasonably ensure the
CIA but without introducing bad control bias, which is another form of selection bias (Angrist
and Pischke 2009). In our case, good controls are variables which are themselves not a (possi-
ble) outcome of university degrees but are relevant for the assignment of the treatment as well
as for the outcome. A safe way to prevent the danger of using controls which could induce
selection bias is to use controls which are themselves already fixed at the time of obtaining a
university degree or are strictly exogenous variables in relation to obtaining one (Imbens and
Wooldridge 2009).
Note that in this paper we do not claim to estimate a pure causal effect as we are sure
that their are other confounding factors we are not able to control for. However, what we can
show is, that existing estimates of returns to education in Austria without proper control for
social background are likely to be severely upward biased.
4.2.2 Average Treatment Effects on the Treated
We will focus on the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which is given by
ATT = 1
NT1∈C ∑i∈{Ti=1∩C}Y1i − Yˆ0i, (4.2.3)
where NT1∈C is the number of treated individuals in the common support C and 1NT1∈C ∑ Yˆ0i
is the estimate of the potential outcome for the treated under non-treatment E [Y0i∣Ti = 1].
The common support C is defined by all covariate combinations (interactions), i.e. realizations
of the covariate vector X 2 where 0 < P (Ti = 1) < 1. In other words, the common support is
all resulting cells where both treated and non-treated individuals are observed (see Blundell
2Note that this strategy is only feasible if all covariate are discrete, or else the set of covariate cells
is not finite.
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et al. (2005)). Therefore realizations of X where P (Ti = 1) = 0 (no treated (no people with
university degrees)) or P (Ti = 1) = 1 (all treated (only people with university degrees)) are
excluded from the calculation of the ATT.
As long as X consists of discrete variables, the average treatment effect as in equation 4.2.3
can in principle be estimated by both OLS (saturated in X) and exact matching procedures
(matched on X). The difference between estimating the ATT via OLS and via the matching
process lies in the different weighting procedures the estimators use. While in the case of the
matching estimator the covariate-distribution among the treated is used to combine covariate-
specific effects into a single ATT, the regression function produces a variance weighted average
of these effects. The matching estimator gives the most weight to the observations most likely
to be treated whereas OLS gives the most weight to covariate combinations where the con-
ditional variance of the treatment is maximized. The more the treatment effect varies across
cells the more divergence there is in the resulting estimates.
In both the matching estimator and the OLS estimator using saturated controls X, only
observations on the common support are used. In the matching estimator the observations in
cells where the support of treated and non-treated is not overlapping cannot be matched and
in OLS their weight is zero3.
As soon as continuous covariates are involved OLS saturated in X as well as exact match-
ing is no longer feasible, as given a finite dataset the probability to find a match (with an
identical realization of X) for a certain treated observations goes to zero. Several possibilities
to control the necessary extrapolation outside the common support are feasible, for example
via very flexible OLS models including higher order polynomials and as many interactions as
possible or propensity score matching using a certain functional form to predict treatment
3The weight given by OLS to the covariate-specific treatment effect in a certain cell is[P (Xi = x∣Ti = 1) (1 − P (Xi = x∣Ti = 1))]P (Xi = x), where x are certain realizations of Xi; see An-
grist and Pischke (2009).
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probability and then match on the treatment probability.
In this empirical application we use coarsened exact matching (CEM) to estimate the
ATT. Iacus et al. (2008) developed a method to temporarily coarse data based on ex-ante
user choice, match on this coarsened data, and then run the analysis on the uncoarsened data4.
The advantage with relation to OLS or other matching methods is that it allows the user to
define the common support C via coarsening continuous variables by ex-ante user choice and
then match the treated to their non-treated counterparts without using a parametric model.
The analysis can then be conducted on the uncoarsened data which allows one to control for
remaining imbalances in X due to coarsening of continuous variables.
4.3 The data
We use data from the Household Survey on Housing Wealth 2008 (HSHW 2008) of the Austrian
Central Bank (Oesterreichische Nationalbank)5. It is an arguably representative household
survey investigating the housing wealth of Austrian households. The respondents were either
the owners or tenants of the respective household’s real estate at the time of the interview.
The survey focused on the ownership of the respective house/apartment and of additional real
estate belonging to any of the household members as well as on the related liabilities owed
by the household. Furthermore, detailed socio-economic characteristics, including the earn-
ings (employed and self-employed monthly net-earnings) were compiled. The questionnaire
contained a total of 168 questions, 28 of which were related to socio-economic characteristics
(additionally, 8 questions had to be answered personally by the interviewers themselves). Fi-
nally, a response rate of 65,1% (2,081 observations) was accomplished.
The HSHW 2008 uses a stratified multistage cluster address random sample. It was car-
4We use cem, a STATA program provided by Matthew Blackwell, Stefano Iacus, Gary King and
Giuseppe Porro, see http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s457127.html
5The HSHW 2008 fieldwork was conducted by the Institute for Empirical Social Studies (IFES).
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ried out using a computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) method, which allows for
immediate plausibility checks during the course of the interview, thus making it possible to
correct for inconsistencies right away. Multiple imputations using chained equations were used
to impute missing values (see Wagner and Zottel (2009) for further general informations on
the survey and specifically Albacete (2012) for informations on the multiple imputations).
The HSHW includes earnings, age, educational attainment as well as the educational at-
tainment of both the mother and the father, for all respondents. We use the HSHW because
it is one of the few datasets for Austria which includes information on parental education6.
However, the HSHW 2008 is focused on household wealth, and therefore not an optimal
source for individual earnings. Nevertheless a question asking for the net monthly earnings
from employed as well as self-employed (asking for an average over the last six months) of the
respondent - which is the owner or tenant of the primary residence - is included. As we do
not have hourly wages and the question with regard to working time per week is categorical
we only use the sub-sample of individuals working 38.5 (Austrian full time) or more hours
per week (as a result, 1018 out of 2081 observations are excluded). As university education is
the main variable of interest in our analysis we drop individuals who are younger than 23, a
reasonable lower age bound in order to have already been able to finish university education
(dropping an additional 45 observations). We also drop individuals older than 65 years of age,
the official retirement age (dropping another 6 observations). Finally we drop all individuals
with monthly net earnings of less than 800 Euro to exclude outliers and reduce possible mea-
surement error (additional 142 households are excluded). This leaves us 870 individuals for
the analysis.
6EU-SILC 2005 contains the information on parental education for Austria. By examining the
dataset, we found that there must have been some problems in the fieldwork concerning these vari-
ables, because their quality is insufficient for scientific analyses. Furthermore, the microcensus of 1996
contains educational background of parents (Fessler et al. (2012))
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Table 4.1 shows a comparison of our main variables with the EU-SILC 2008 dataset. Ex-
perience is calculated in the standard ways by individuals age minus years of schooling minus
six (see Card (1999)), where years of schooling are calculated from the discrete educational
attainment variables in both surveys. EU-SILC, which is focused on income and therefore a
more reliable source for individual incomes, collects yearly net earnings of all employed and
self-employed individuals (aged 16 and older) living in the surveyed households. To get a
proxy for monthly earnings we divide the yearly values by 12 in case of self-employed earnings
and by 14 in case of employed earnings, which reflects the fact that employed individuals get
a 13th and 14th extra salary7. Furthermore we used the same restrictions for individuals in
the EU-SILC dataset as described for the HSHW, i.e. only full-time working individuals aged
between 23 and 65 and with monthly net earnings of 800 Euro or more. That leaves us 3492
individuals for our analysis.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Variables
HSHW 2008 EU-SILC 2008
Min Median Mean Max Min Median Mean Max
Earnings 800.00 1,700.00 2,068.28 10,976.00 800.00 1,612.07 1,878.80 72,319.88
Age 23.00 43.00 42.03 64.00 23.00 42.00 41.71 65.00
University 0.00 0.00 0.14 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 1.00
Experience 2.00 25.75 24.71 46.00 1.00 25.00 24.21 49.00
Female 0.00 0.00 0.40 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 1.00
Note that besides the differences in terms of measurement of the target variables, the
samples do not refer to the exact same reference population. Both surveys are household sur-
veys, but the HSHW 2008 only covers information on individual earnings for the respondent,
whereas EU-SILC covers that information for all individuals aged 16 or more. Nevertheless as
table 4.1 shows the variables seem to be surprisingly close to each other with regard to their
distributions.
7Note that this leads to a slight upward bias, because fewer taxes have to be paid for the two extra
salaries
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With respect to earnings the EU-SILC includes some individuals with relatively high earn-
ings, but only 5, who lie over the maximum of the HSHW. Also in terms of the share of
individuals with university degree there is a slight difference of around 2 percentage points.
All in all the educational attainments of respondents as well as those of their parents compare
with other data sources from Statistics Austria quite well (see also Fessler and Schneebaum
(2012)). The only larger difference in terms of our variables is the difference in the share of
females. While the percentage of females is around 40% in the HSHW it is only around 30%
in EU-SILC. In the Austrian Labour Force Survey 2008 the share women in total of full-time
employed individuals is around 35% (Statistik Austria (2010)). The differences might be due
to the aforementioned difference in the reference populations of the surveys.
4.4 Results
OLS Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the results of three OLS regressions estimated with HSHW
2008 and EU-SILC 2008 data respectively. The first column Diff reports the unconditional
effect of university degree on earnings. The second column Mincerian I refers to the classical
Mincerian specification as given in equation 4.2.1 and the third column Mincerian II adds a
female dummy to control for gender differences.
The (university) coefficient does not change significantly over the different specifications in
both datasets. The difference in terms of the size between the EU-SILC and HSHW datasets
is likely due to the differences in measurement and reference populations of both surveys.
However in both datasets the measured effects of university degree on earnings are positive,
economically relevant and statistically significant in all specifications. A causal interpretation,
however, is not in order as (i) the specifications rely on strong linearity assumptions and strong
112
Table 4.2: HSHW Regressions of earnings on university degree
Diff Mincerian I Mincerian II
University 0.211*** 0.219*** 0.219***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Experience 0.038*** 0.038***
(0.007) (0.007)
Experience squared -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.072**
(0.032)
N 870 870 870
Notes: This table shows the average treatment effects of university degree on earnings resulting from
OLS regressions using several sets of covariates as controls.
Table 4.3: SILC Regressions of earnings on university degree
Diff Mincerian I Mincerian II
University 0.350*** 0.381*** 0.396***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Experience 0.025*** 0.024***
(0.003) (0.003)
Experience squared -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.184***
(0.013)
N 3492 3492 3492
Notes: This table shows the average treatment effects of university degree on earnings resulting from
OLS regressions using several sets of covariates as controls.
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extrapolation outside the common support when averaging the treatment effect (regression co-
efficient), (ii) experience is already an outcome of our treatment variable university degree and
therefore introduces bias, and (iii) selection bias is likely to be very severe as individuals with
university degree might have higher earnings anyway and no proper controls for the selection
to university are included.
CEM-ATT Table 4.5 shows the results of our coarsened exact matching estimates for
ATT as given in equation 4.2.3. Our matching variables are female, age, experience and the
maximum of parental education (fathers or mothers educational attainment measured in six
categories). Female and parental education are discrete variables which we can match using
exact matching. Experience and age are continuous variables which we coarse temporarily
then match exactly on the coarsened dataset and analyse the dataset in its uncoarsened but
matched form. In other words, we re-weight the dataset to balance the joint distribution of the
covariates. Experience is temporarily coarsened to deciles of experience and age to categories
(23-29; 30-39; 40-49; 50-59; 60-65). We use three different matching specifications which are
shown in table 4.4. The first one (CEM I) is used as a benchmark case and does not control
for parental education. In the second and third (CEM II and CEM III) we control for parental
education in order to eliminate this confounding factor, which might (i) have a strong influ-
ence on the education level of the individuals and (ii) might have also a direct impact on the
earnings of the individuals e.g. via network effects or abilities passed over generations but not
reflected in education.
For the estimation of the ATT in column CEM I we only matched on experience and
female to have a benchmark case to our OLS estimates. The estimate, although resulting
from a more flexible model, is not different from the OLS estimates.
CEM II reports the estimated ATT after matching on experience, female and parental
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Table 4.4: Coarsened Exact Matching
CEM I CEM II CEM III
Matching variables Exp, Fem Exp, Fem, PE Age, Fem, PE
No. of Covariate Combinations 16 82 50
Common Support 15 54 36
University NO YES NO YES NO YES
All 752 118 752 118 752 118
Matched 726 118 596 111 682 115
Unmatched 26 0 156 7 70 3
Table 4.5: Estimated ATT via coarsened exact matching
CEM I CEM II CEM III
University 0.209*** 0.129** 0.126**
(0.042) (0.053) (0.053)
Experience 0.036*** 0.023**
(0.008) (0.011)
Experience squared -0.001*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.079***
(0.019)
Age squared -0.001***
(0.000)
N 843 706 796
Notes: This table shows the average treatment effects of university degree on earnings resulting from
coarsened exact matching estimators.
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education. In this set-up individuals with university degree are only compared with their
counterparts having no university degree but who also have - along with the same gender and
experience - the exact same parental education. As parental education is a strong predictor
for individual education it reduces selection bias up to a certain extent which leads to already
much lower estimate of ATT.
CEM III reports the estimated ATT after matching on age, female and parental education.
Since experience is already an outcome of education it is not a good control (see Angrist and
Pischke 2009). Instead we use age itself. The resulting estimated ATT is again slightly lower.
In all three specifications we control for the remaining imbalances in the variables, which
where temporarily coarsened, by including controls when calculating the ATTs.
Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 show the ATTs of CEM I, CEM II and CEM III respectively, but
locally averaged over three different parental education categories. This allows us to look at
the conditional effects (ATTs) underlying the estimated overall ATTs, which are given in table
4.5. Without control for parental education the effect for individuals with university degree is
highest for those with high parental background (fig. 4.1, CEM I ) and significant for individ-
uals with low, medium and high parental education. With parental control the effects are on
the contrary only significant for individuals with low and medium parental background. Fur-
thermore when using age instead of experience effects are highest for those with low parental
education (fig. 4.2 and 4.3,CEM II and CEM III ).
All in all the effects without the use of parental control seem to be too large as well as mis-
leading once looking at the underlying local effects. Once controlled for parental education we
(i) find smaller returns to education and (ii) different heterogenous effects which are basically
turned around. The standard mincerian approach without control for parental education is
based on underlying estimated higher returns for individuals with higher parental education.
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Once controlling for parental education we see that this result is mainly due to selection bias
and the opposite is true: effects for individuals with high parental education are insignificant
while for individuals with lower parental education we still find significant effects. This is
due to the fact that the models without control for parental education compare apples to or-
anges. By averaging the treatment effects over the different groups of individuals with different
parental backgrounds they ignore the fact that individuals with higher parental background
tend to have higher earnings also because of other reasons than their own education (selection
bias). If apples are only compared to apples and oranges to oranges, namely measuring the
treatment effect of higher education only inside groups with the same parental background,
and than aggregating that to an overall effect we find that the returns to education are indeed
much smaller and reveal a different underlying structure of conditional effects.
For Austria, we therefore conclude that returns to education measured without control for
parental educational background (or other social background variables), will typically overes-
timate the causal effect of educational attainment on earnings.
4.5 Conclusion
We employed HSHW 2008 data to illustrate that using standard mincerian equations when
estimating so-called returns to education might overestimate the returns to education severely.
Being able to control via parental education at least partly for selection bias due to social back-
ground we find indeed strong positive selection bias, i.e. descendants with highly educated
parents (i) sort into higher education themselves more often (ii) have higher income already
without university degree. Therefore without using parental education as a control, returns
to education are likely overestimated. Furthermore we show that the effect of education on
earnings might be very heterogenous over individuals with different social backgrounds. Once
controlling for parental education we only find significant effects of education on income for
individuals in lower parental education groups. For individuals with high parental education
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Figure 4.1: ATT over parental education levels
Notes:
(i) This figure shows the average treatment effects of university degree on earnings
conditional on parental education resulting from CEM I. In Specification CEM I we
control for (match on) experience and gender.
Figure 4.2: ATT over parental education levels
Notes:
(i) This figure shows the average treatment effects of university degree on earnings
conditional on parental education resulting from CEM II. In Specification CEM II we
control for (match on) experience, gender and parental education.
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Figure 4.3: ATT over parental education levels
Notes:
(i) This figure shows the average treatment effects of university degree on earnings
conditional on parental education resulting from CEM III. In Specification CEM III we
control for (match on) age, gender and parental education.
a university degree does not have a significant effect on income, as there are obviously other
forces at play that increase income without additional education.
We conclude that “returns to education” estimated by standard mincerian equations - omitting
social background variables - are often biased. By controlling for parental education we show
for Austria that for a large degree, the so-called “return” measured is actually due to selection
bias. However we do not claim that the effect measured in this paper should be interpreted as
a causal one as we can definitely not eliminate all selection bias. More research using (natural)
(quasi-) experiments is needed to tackle this issue in Austria.
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Appendix A
Abstracts
A.1 English Abstract
A.1.1 The Gendered Aspects of the Intergenerational Persis-
tence of Educational Attainment in Austria
In many societies, childrens’ education levels are heavily dependent on their parents’ educa-
tion, but that result can differ by the gender of the child. Using a Markovian approach, along
with uni- and multivariate econometric techniques, we employ the Austrian Household Survey
on Housing Wealth to show strong persistence in educational attainment that differs by the
gender of the parent and the child. We find that the size of educational persistence varies over
time in Austria and that the relevance of one’s father’s education is generally higher than that
of the mother, once controlling for distributional differences. Further, the relationship between
parents and children of the same gender is stronger than the cross-gender parent/child rela-
tionship. The educational penalty for females has been shrinking over time while educational
mobility for both genders has increased over time.
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A.1.2 Assets and Liabilities of Austrian Households
On macro level data one can see that assets as well as liabilities of private households increased
rapidly in recent years. This is true for many OECD countries including Austria. The parallel
movement on macro level of both is for itself not puzzling. Though to assess financial stability
issues its of utmost importance to know which households are responsible for the growth
of liabilities and assets. Are these different ones or the same ones? We try to asses this
question and to gain deeper insights in what determines the participation in debt market
and what determines the volume of debt. Conducting descriptive statistics and a Heckman
Selection model on the basis of Survey data, we find that higher income, higher educated and
households of larger size tend to hold debt more often and higher amounts of debt. Surprisingly
the amount of debt is also rising with financial assets of a household.
A.1.3 The Role of Data Production in Survey Analysis
A large amount of economic research is based on analysis of observed data; this paper discusses
some aspects of the relationship and disconnect between data collection and data analysis. It
is usually the case that the data collectors are not the same individuals as those analysing the
data, and in nearly all cases, collected data is heavily influenced by the individuals gathering
the data. We show how the data production process can influence data analysis and its
results, discuss the caveats of survey data analysis with respect to sampling, the survey mode,
interviewing, paradata, weights and imputation and document how ignoring those issues might
lead to severe bias as well as a misleading precision of estimates when analysing the data.
A.1.4 A Note on the Effects of Higher Education on Earnings
A vast literature exists estimating the effects of education on individual earnings. As those
attaining a certain education most likely would earn also more without one than those without
a certain education many approaches have been used to control for unobserved heterogeneity
and resulting selection bias in order to give the estimated coefficients a causal interpretation.
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Most prominent are instrumental variable approaches based on either institutional features of
the school system or family background, siblings and twin datasets as well as direct controls
for abilities or family background. In this paper we employ Austrian HSHW 2008 data which
allows us to control for parental education in order to estimate the effect of university education
on earnings. By allowing for heterogenous returns using non-parametric models we show that
the effects of a university degree on earnings decreases sharply with model flexibility as well as
with parental education. Using coarsened exact matching to establish common support and
construct a meaningfull counterfactual we find that the conditional average treatment effect of
university education on earnings is significant given low parental education but insignificant
given high parental education. This points towards severe bias with regard to so called returns
to education in standard mincerian approaches which tend to ignore selection bias related to
parental education.
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A.2 German Abstract
A.2.1 The Gendered Aspects of the Intergenerational Persis-
tence of Educational Attainment in Austria
Der Ausbildungsgrad von Eltern und Kindern ist in vielen Gesellschaften stark korreliert.
Dieser Zusammenhang unterscheidet sich auf der Ebene der Geschlechter von Eltern und
Kindern sowie deren Kombination. Auf Basis des österreichischen Household Survey on Hous-
ing Wealth zeigen wir dass (i) es eine starke Persistenz in Bezug auf die Bildung über die
Generationen hinweg gibt (ii) die Persistenz über die zeigt stark variert und (iii) starke Muster
je nach Geschlecht der Eltern und Kinder aufweist. Im Allgemeinen ist die Korrelation zwis-
chen Vätern und Kindern stärker als zwischen Müttern und Kinder. Weiters ist jene zwischen
Vätern und Söhnen stärker als jene zwischen Vätern und Töchtern sowie jene zwischen Müt-
tern und Töchtern stärker als jene zwischen Müttern und Söhnen. Trotz eines Schließens der
Bildungslücke der Geschlechter bleiben diese Muster stabil.
A.2.2 Assets and Liabilities of Austrian Households
Auf Makroebene kann in den letzten Jahrzehnten ein starker Anstieg der Schulden, aber
auch des Geldvermögens, privater Haushalte beobachtet werden. Doch handelt es sich um
die Selben oder Andere Haushalte, die für diese Phänomene verantwortlich zeichnen? Diese
Frage ist von enormer Bedeutung für die Finanzmarktstabilität. Wir versuchen auf Basis
von Mikrodaten einen Einblick in die Determinanten der Verschuldung und deren Höhe zu
erlangen. Mit Hilfe eines Heckman Selection Models zeigt sich, dass abgesehen vom Alter vor
allem Einkommen, Bildung und Haushaltsgröße wichtige Determinanten für die Verschuldung
darstellen. Bemerkenswerterweise steigt die Verschuldung aber auch mit dem Geldvermögen
der Haushalte.
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A.2.3 The Role of Data Production in Survey Analysis
Ein großer Bereich der empirischen Wirtschaftsforschung basiert auf der Analyse von Erhe-
bungsdaten (Surveydaten). In diesem Papier besprechen wir die zentralen Aspekte des Ver-
hältnisses und der Trennung zwischen Datenerfassung und Datenanalyse. Im Allgemeinen
sind die Datenproduzenten nicht gleichzeitig jene Personen die die Daten analysieren. Wir be-
sprechen, wie der Datenproduktionsprozeß die Datenanalyse und ihre Resultate beeinflussen
kann. Dabei werden die Themengebiete Stichprobenziehung, Erhebungsinstrumente, Para-
daten, Gewichte und Imputationen besprochen und gezeigt wie das Ignorieren derselben zu
verzerrten Schätzern und irreführenden - meist zu kleinen - Standardfehlern derselben führen
kann.
A.2.4 A Note on the Effects of Higher Education on Earnings
Eine umfangreiche ökonomische Literatur beschäftigt sich mit den Effekten der Ausbildung
eines Individuums auf dessen Einkommen. Da jene Individuen, die ein bestimmtes Ausbil-
dungsniveau erreichen wahrscheinlich auch mehr verdienen würden ohne diese Ausbildung als
jene, die dieses Niveau gar nicht erreichen würden oder wollen, ist es notwendig für diesen
Selektions-Bias zu kontrollieren. Wir zeigen, dass die in der "Returns to Education" Liter-
atur besonders verbreiteten Mincer-Spezifikation tendenziell den Effekt der Ausbildung auf das
Einkommen überschätzen. Anhand von flexiblen nicht-parametrischen Methoden kann zudem
gezeigt werden dass der Effekt der Ausbildung sowohl mit der Felxibilität der Spezifikation als
auch mit der Elternbildung abnimmt. Neben der Tatsache, dass die Standard Mincer Spezifika-
tion den Selektions-Bias in Bezug auf die Elternbildung zu einer deutlichen Übrschätzung des
Effekts führt dokumentieren wir damit, dass Ausbildung vor allem für Personen mit niedriger
Elternbildung zu höherem Einkommen führen kann während jene mit hoher Elternbildung
auch ohne eigene Ausbildung schon zu einem relativ hohen Einkommen gelangen und daher
der Bildungseffekt auf das Einkommen für diese Gruppe vernachlässigbar ist.
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